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INTRODUCTION
“Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows
how extremely expensive it is to be poor . . . .”
–James Baldwin1
The large number of Americans that do not use the traditional
banking system is among the untenable economic conditions that the 2008
financial crisis made more visible.2 In the United States, over a quarter of
Americans are financially excluded from the traditional banking system and
arguably economically unstable.3 Approximately 6.5 percent of American
households are unbanked, and another 18.7 percent are underbanked.4

1

James Baldwin, Fifth Avenue Uptown, ESQUIRE MAG., July 1960, at 70, 73.
“Banking” as used in this Article refers to providing payment services and the mechanisms,
e.g., cash, checks, credit cards, traveler's checks, letters of credit, and electronic fund
transfers, used to transfer money from one person to another. See RICHARD S. CARNELL,
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 65
(6th ed. 2017) (defining banks as financial intermediaries that offer payment services); see
generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 17 (2017), https://www. fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/
2017report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E AK-J7GD] [hereinafter 2017 FDIC SURVEY] (defining
underbanked and unbanked populations by their use of alternative financial services (AFS)
and their use or disuse of the banking system).
3
See generally 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 17 (reporting that that 25.2 percent of
surveyed Americans were unbanked or underbanked); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor,
21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123 (2004) (explaining that individuals without bank accounts find
it harder to save but are the ones who most need to be able to save).
4
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 17. The survey classifies two different groups who
do not use the formal financial services economy as the unbanked and the underbanked.
Id. An unbanked household is one where no one in the household has a checking or savings
account. Id. An underbanked household is one that uses alternative financial services
providers, such as payday lenders, rent-to-own services, pawn shops, non-bank money
orders, non-bank check-cashing services, non-bank remittances, or refund anticipation
loans. Id.
2
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Consumers, obviously, are opting not to do banks,5 but the question is why.6
For a myriad of sound reasons, underserved Americans use
alternative financial services (AFS), or so-called fringe banks7, such as
check cashers and payday lenders.8 Fringe banks are more accessible
geographically, take into account consumers’ needs for immediate
liquidity, and provide reliable products with transparent pricing. 9 Fringe
banks also offer high cost, destabilizing products and services which
make it even more difficult for users to move into the financial
mainstream. 10 Financial services deregulation coupled with the market
5

“We don’t do banks” is a common refrain in households that do not have bank accounts.
ROURKE O’BRIEN, NEW AM. FOUND., “WE DON’T DO BANKS”: FINANCIAL LIVES OF FAMILIES
ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 1 (2012), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3772-wedont-do-banks/RourkeMarch2012.280c7e858336448499de926c84038108.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WQP8-L97W].
6
See 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4 (listing reasons why consumers were
unbanked). Several academics have considered the issue of financial inclusion. See
generally Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit:
Preserving the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 1217 (2004) (using contextual analysis to explain who exactly uses the alternative
financial system and why); Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62
EMORY L.J. 483 (2013) (tracking the history of how the two-tier financial system came to
be); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(arguing for increased regulation of the consumer credit industry); Barr, supra note 3
(explaining the high cost of alternative financial systems on the poor); Richard R.W.
Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994 (2006) (discussing the transaction costs
of fringe credit reporting); Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer
Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000)
(analyzing the rise of the two-tier financial services marketplace and warning that its rise
could lead to a rising gap between the have and have-nots in society). Public policy reforms
to attract consumers that do not participate in the formal banking system must take into
account the reasons that consumers are financially excluded.
7
Fringe banking is defined as “the arena of financial services that enables people with bad
or no credit and without access to mainstream financial institutions to obtain money.”
Mary A. Caplan, Communities Respond to Predatory Lending, 59 SOC. WORK 149, 149
(2014). Clients of fringe bankers are also often referred to as the unbanked. Id. at 152.
8
See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND
THE POOR 12-35 (1996) (discussing the fringe banking industry and how households use
these alternative financial service providers).
9
See Lisa J. Sevron & Antonieta Castro-Cosio, Reframing the Debate About Financial
Inclusion: Evidence from an Up-Close View of Alternative Financial Services 24–26 (Mar.
5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
10
See Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Racial Injustice. Here’s How.
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/13/yourcredit-score-is-racist-heres-why [https://perma.cc/4S7Y-DGGT] (detailing the consequences
of using fringe bank products). Fringe bank users, who are primarily Black and Latino, are
more likely to have damaged credit. Id.
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development of asset-backed securitization have morphed the fringe
banking market into a multibillion dollar market.11
The two-tiered financial system of formal and informal banks is often
justified based on rational choice, meaning individuals opt to use fringe banks.12
Overwhelmingly, instead of opting out, the underbanked and unbanked are
underserved by the traditional banking sector.13 Yet, financial inclusion––access
to and participation in the formal banking economy––remains the primary way
to enter the financial mainstream. The high transaction costs of check cashing
and small-dollar credit potentially increase households’ financial distress,
reducing borrowers’ creditworthiness and potentially decreasing their ability
to obtain conventional credit and banking services.14
Participation in the financial mainstream has macro and micro effects.
Mainstream consumers are often financially stable and have economic
mobility. They build wealth, acquire assets, establish credit, and obtain

11

See MATT FELLOWES & MIA MABANTA, THE BROOKINGS INST., BANKING ON WEALTH:
AMERICA’S NEW RETAIL BANKING INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS WEALTH-BUILDING POTENTIAL
11 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/banking-on-wealth-americas-new-retailbanking-infrastructure-and-its-wealth-building-potential/ [https://perma.cc/77KJ-LNBZ]
(“The $100 billion size of the high-cost non-bank basic financial services industry, including
check cashers, payday lenders, and pawnshops, points to the high demand for basic financial
services among low- and moderate-income customers.”).
12
See O’BRIEN, supra note 5; see also 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4.
13
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 4. The deregulation of the banking industry in the
early 1980s was disadvantageous to low-income consumers because small balance accounts
were required to pay increased fees and charges for banking services. Efforts to mitigate the
high costs of bank and nonbank services included legislation proposing universal access to
bank accounts. See H.R. 2661, 99th Cong. (1985) (requiring every federally insured depository
institution to offer a basic account with no minimum balance, no fee for the first eight checks
and the first five other withdrawals each month, and specified limits on other charges); H.R.
2011, 99th Cong. (1985) (requiring federally insured depository institutions to offer at least
type of account to those with less than $1000 on deposit). A joint regulatory statement
also encouraged banks to offer low-cost basic banking services. BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED.
RESERVE SYS., JOINT POLICY STATEMENT ON BASIC FINANCIAL SERVICES (1986),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-2200.html#fdic5000jointps2 [https://
perma.cc/CB8T-GMF8].
14
See Kathryn Fritzdixon, Jim Hawkins & Paige Marta Skiba, Dude, Where’s My Car Title?:
The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 1103 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 104150 (2014) (outlining the psychological factors that relate to title lending and positing that the
true costs of loans are often underestimated); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do
Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?, 62 J.L. & ECON. 485, 486 (2019) (using statistical analysis
to find a connection between the use of payday lending and higher rates of bankruptcy); see
also Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinnman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military
Personnel Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805, 2825–26 (2014) (positing that members of
the armed services create or exacerbate financial problems by borrowing money).
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affordable loans.15 They accumulate savings and have insurance to buffer a
crisis. Society benefits when individuals have the necessary tools to develop
the skills needed to manage their resources and risks.16 A basic bank account
is one such tool.
While financial inclusion is easily recognized as a developmental
priority in emerging countries, it is no less important in a developed country,
such as the United States.17 Banks are integral to the proper functioning of a
market economy.18 Banks accept deposits and provide financial intermediation
for consumers,19 Although fringe banks do not provide deposit accounts,
15

Use of a bank account has been associated with an increase in savings, female
empowerment and consumption, and productive investment of entrepreneurs. See Franklin
Allen et al., The Foundations of Financial Inclusion: Understanding Ownership and Use of
Formal Accounts 32–34 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper
No. 6290, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 348241468329061640/Thefoundations-of-financial-inclusion-understanding-ownership-and-use-of-formal-accounts
[https://perma.cc/Q58H-Q7DY] (arguing for policies that reduce barriers to financial
inclusion in order to encourage and promote financial inclusion).
16
Broader access to bank accounts can have a positive effect on financial stability because
increased financial intermediation results in lower transaction costs and increased dispersal of
capital and risk across the economy. See Rui Han & Martin Melecky, Financial Inclusion for
Financial Stability: Access to Bank Deposits and the Growth of Deposits in the Global Financial
Crisis 16–17 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6577, 2013), https://open
knowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16010 [https://perma.cc/BVB5-B7LQ] (concluding
that policies promoting financial inclusion and the broader use of bank deposits can enhance
overall financial stability as well as the financial system); see also Selahattin Selsah Pasali,
Where Is the Cheese? Synthesizing a Giant Literature on Causes and Consequences of
Financial Sector Development 5–6 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6655,
2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/730041468152101741/pdf/WPS6655.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HQJ-DXVC] (surveying literature on the financial sector and finding a
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth and employment).
17
One study cited the availability of alternatives to formal financial institutions as the
primary difference between the United States and other developed countries. See Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt & Leora Klapperm, Measuring Financial Inclusion: Explaining Variation
in Use of Financial Services Across and Within Countries, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, Spring 2013, at 279, 279–96 (2013) (studying developed and developing
countries by measuring levels and patterns of use of different financial products and services
globally and among different groups according to age, sex, and income among other factors
which are collected in a World Bank financial inclusion database, “The Global Findex”). The
United States lags significantly behind Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, countries
with broadly similar economic development and legal traditions, but have well-developed,
sustainable, financial inclusion policies. Id.
18
The Federal Reserve, as the central bank, has the regulatory authority to protect those not
well served by our banking system. That responsibility seems even more compelling given
the central bank’s financial assistance to investment banks during the subprime financial
crisis. See discussion infra Part IV.
19
Commercial Bank, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commercialbank.
asp [https://perma.cc/3TJT-RRMC] (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
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consumers use them for check cashing, bill paying, and short-term loans. The
high cost products and services of fringe banks are justified as filling a void in
the regulatory system.20 To the contrary, fringe banking empowers financial
exclusion and ultimately contributes to micro and macro financial instability.21
This Article participates in the discourse about the efficacy of the
financial regulatory system for unbanked and underbanked consumers.22
While banking regulatory agencies recognize the value of diversity and
inclusion in the banking economy, this aspirational vision has yielded few

20

See LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES
7 ( 2017) (describing the struggles of check casher patrons that result from failures in the bank
system); see also What Is Driving The ‘Unbanking Of America’?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: FRESH
AIR (Jan. 10, 2017, 1:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/10/509126878/what-is-driving-theunbanking-of-america [https://perma.cc/H9XE-QQ2N] (speaking to the idea that people who
use alternative banking systems are making rational choices).
21
See Ronald A. Wirtz, Will That Be Cash, Check or Debtor’s Hell?, FED. RES. BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS (Oct. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/willthat-be-cash-check-or-debtors-hell [https://perma.cc/3AFW-AN5K] (“Banks, for example,
don’t typically make the $200 loans common among payday lenders. Given poor credit
histories, credit cards can also be difficult to obtain (and, in fact, can be the original source
of financial problems).”). As discussed infra Part III, there is statistical evidence that many
U.S. citizens are excluded from formal financial services due to market failures. See also
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 10 (2012) (describing an IMF study that found a link between
inequality and lower growth). But the high and positive growth rates in financial depth vary
dramatically between developing and developed countries. See Financial Depth, THE
WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/gfdr-2016/background/
financial-depth [https://perma.cc/H5LM-4FD2] (last accessed Aug. 3, 2020) (describing
financial depth in relation to economic development). In the United States, a developed
country, expanding financial inclusion is also significant for socio-economic development.
See Financial Inclusion: A Challenge for Developing and Developed Countries,
MICROWORLD.ORG (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.microworld.org/en/news-from-the-field/
article/financial-inclusion-challenge-developing-and-developed-countries [https://perma.cc/
EU5M-VLA6] (linking financial inclusion to social inclusion). While there is a strong
correlation between not using the formal banking economy and income inequality, it is an
erroneous assumption that those who do not use formal financial services are somehow
constrained from participating in it. As discussed infra, statistics evidence that many U.S.
citizens are excluded from formal financial services due to market failures.
22
See Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in
America?, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 231–43 (2016) (arguing mobile banking has high
potential to transform the economic reality of the unbanked in America); see also Baradaran,
supra note 6, at 509–10 (discussing the success of community development credit unions);
Barr, supra note 3, at 124 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of alternative financial service
providers); Aleta Sprague, Next Generation TANF: Reconceptualizing Public Assistance as a
Vehicle for Financial Inclusion, 18 U.D.C. L. REV. 144, 164–74 (2015) (arguing for policy
reforms that both remove access barriers and create entry points to the financial mainstream).
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real improvements for under- and unbanked communities.23 The lack of a
sustainable, financial inclusion policy has not only developed a robust fringe
bank economy, but has embedded its operations in marginalized
communities. In this regard, financial exclusion must be viewed within a
framework that recognizes the systemic bias and exclusion inherent in the
formal banking economy.24 To the extent that the banking regulatory system
fails to provide access to basic banking services, it forces the economically
marginalized into the informal banking system.
Specifically, this Article proposes eliminating the structural barriers
that exclude fringe bank consumers from the financial mainstream.25 This
change in the regulatory and supervisory structure of financial institutions
will mitigate the risks and the implementation costs of providing access while
yielding significant micro and macroeconomic changes.26
This Article makes three points. First, it contends that financial
exclusion, through banking desserts and inadequate products and pricing,
creates and maintains social and economic domination in low and moderate
income (LMI) communities. Social Dominance Theory (SDT) informs the
discussion of how the regulatory failure to promote and monitor financial
inclusion supports the disparate, two-tier banking system.27 Second, this Article
asserts that a transaction account is an essential financial service because it
provides an individual with access to the payment system and is critical to
23
See, e.g., About Us, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.
gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html [https://perma.cc/8ERX-3PCW] (last visited
Jan. 16, 2019) (committing the OCC to “protecting consumers by making sure banks give fair
access and equal treatment to customers and comply with consumer banking laws”). The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), charters national banks and savings associations.
Id. The OCC is an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Id.
24
A society’s dominant group determines the economic and social benefits that the society’s
subordinate group will receive, which in this case is access to the higher priced, less
beneficial fringe banking system. See infra Section II.B.
25
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010). The most significant reform of the financial industry since the Great
Depression, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Id. at
Title X. The CFPB uses its broad regulatory powers to regulate all consumer transactions
including those provided by alternative financial service providers. Id.
26
See generally ROBERT CULL, TILMAN EHRBECK & NINA HOLLE, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO
ASSIST POOR, FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND DEVELOPMENT: RECENT IMPACT EVIDENCE 1 (2014),
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/FocusNote-Financial-Inclusion-and-DevelopmentApril-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7SC-98VK] (summarizing findings about macro- and
micro-economic changes that come from increased financial inclusion).
27
Donald P. Morgan et al., Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information, LIBERTY
STREET ECON. (Mar. 7, 2016), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/bankingdes erts-branch-closings-and-soft-information.html [https://perma.cc/476D-8XBW]. Social
Dominance Theory recognizes that group-based hierarchies use legitimizing myths to allocate
society’s goods and perpetuate inequalities. See infra Section II.B.

68

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[April 2020

accessing other financial services, including savings accounts and credit lines.28
Third, the pervasiveness of the payment system in a market economy dictates a
sustainable regulatory response to address financial exclusion.29
This Article concludes by proposing initial steps for a more appropriate
regulatory approach to bring fringe bank consumers into the financial
mainstream. It addresses the lack of a unified financial inclusion policy by
proposing national goals with reporting requirements and awarding tax incentives
to federally insured financial institutions that offer LMI transaction accounts.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II exposes the
roots of fringe banking and the two-tiered banking system and presents
financial exclusion as a socioeconomic system.30 It identifies market failures
which resulted in banking exclusion and concludes by arguing that failure to
have access to safe, secure, and affordable banking services constitutes
socioeconomic domination.
Part III argues that the fiscal financial linkage between payment
processing and financial stability underlies the public benefit of banking. It also
examines the existing and proposed models of financial inclusion and highlights
similarities in approaches to addressing the issues of access to financial services
for LMI consumers. Part III concludes by discussing the risks and
implementation costs of changes to our regulatory and supervisory structure.31
In light of the concerns discussed in previous sections, Part IV
discusses the Federal Reserve’s responsibility to exercise its regulatory
authority to address financial inclusion. Regulation promoting financial
inclusion can ease the economic costs of providing entry to the formal
28

“Essential financial services” are generally defined as the basic financial services essential
to an individual’s daily needs. See Financial Services Sector, INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/030315/what-financial-services-sector.asp [https://
perma.cc/DDC5-LELL] (defining the term “essential financial services”). Essential financial
services include: “a bank account to receive income; a transaction account to make payments
from; a savings account to store money; and access to unsecured credit to manage temporary
cash shortages and unexpected expenses.” STEFANIE LAMMERMANN, FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 26 (2010), http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/Eu_SW2010_
Financial_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA6P-9LCH]; see also Edward L. Rubin, The Lifeline
Banking Controversy: Putting Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. L.J.
213, 221–30 (1992) (discussing a proposed “lifeline” checking account for low-income people to
receive basic checking account services at a below market rate as a matter of social equity).
29
See generally MARIA CHIARA MALAGUTI, PAYMENT SYSTEM REGULATION FOR IMPROVING
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 2, 4 n.2 (2015), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-PolicyPaper-70-Malaguti-Payment-Systems-Financial-Inclusion-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS9A-N2
7C] (“Payment and settlement systems thus play a crucial role in a market economy and
central banks have always had a close interest in them as part of their responsibilities for
monetary and financial stability.” (citation omitted)).
30
See infra Part II.
31
See infra Part III.
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banking economy. It can also impede the private interests of fringe banks that
thrive at the expense of LMI consumers. Specifically, Part IV proposes a twoprong approach. First, banks must identify and report on financial inclusion
goals as a part of their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements.
Second, to defray the costs of LMI transaction accounts, banks offering these
accounts should receive tax incentives.
Who has access to the formal banking economy is an issue of
regulatory import. The dearth of affordable banking products and services
specifically geared to LMI consumers transforms basic transaction accounts
into luxury services that can only be afforded by a select few. The lack of
choice and unequal access to financial products is the effect of a failed
regulatory structure. Re-aligning the banking regulatory structure is
imperative to correct the market’s inefficiencies and allow financial
institutions an opportunity to both attract and serve those outside of the
formal banking economy.
I. DEFINING FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
Financial exclusion, or a lack of access to the quality basic financial
services which are essential to daily life, can occur at varying levels.
Mainstream financial institutions offer essential financial tools and services,
such as deposit and savings accounts, credit, and insurance. By contrast,
financial exclusion is recognized widely as a deterrent to economic and social
integration. Marginalized groups that do not have access to certain financial
products do not appreciate their value. Financial access for financially
vulnerable groups requires products with both structures and pricing that
promotes financial stability. Without these products, marginalized groups are
basically ousted from participating in the formal banking sector.
A. The Two-Tiered Banking System
Well-functioning financial systems offer savings, payment services,
as well as credit and risk management to a high percentage of consumers and
businesses.32 Those who are excluded rely instead on informal alternative
financial services.33

32

See Malaguti, supra note 29, at 2 (describing how a nation’s financial structure requires
an infrastructure built on safety and soundness that consumers trust and perceive as fair).
33
See Barr, supra note 3, at 141–74 (describing the assortment of alternative financial
services providers who make basic financial services available to low-income persons).
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In 2009, an FDIC biennial survey began evaluating financial
inclusion in the formal banking economy.34 The survey measured
inclusiveness by determining the number of people who possess insured
bank accounts in the previous 12 months.35
The 2017 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households
reported that 8.4 million or 6.5 percent of American households were
“unbanked” or do not have a bank account.36 According to the FDIC, 24.2
million or 18.7 percent of American households are underbanked.37 These
consumers conduct their routine financial business, relying upon AFS in addition
to, or instead of, traditional financial institutions.38 Together, these numbers
reveal that 25.2 percent of American households were financially excluded in
2017.39
34

The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming Amendment Act requires the FDIC to
collect data biannually on the unbanked and underbanked and on traditional financial
institutions' efforts to make traditional credit products available to them. Federal Deposit
Insurance Reform Conforming Amendments Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-173, § 7(a)(1),
119 Stat. 3601, 3609-10 (2006) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831z (2018)). The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted the first study of the unbanked in 2002. According
to that report, 51 percent of adults earning less than $15,000 per year and 36 percent of adults
earning within the range of $15,000 to $30,000 per year were unbanked. See U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, GAO-02-913, Electronic Transfers: Use by Federal Payment
Recipients Has Increased but Obstacles to Greater Participating Remain 57 (2002),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02913.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSZ2-WATV] (discussing the
income groups of the underbanked).
35
Published in 2009, this first survey, the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked
Households, found that approximately thirty million or 27.6 percent of U.S. households were
either unbanked or underbanked, with 7.7 percent unbanked and 17.9 percent underbanked. See
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2009 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2009), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2009/full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EF8-6KFL] [hereinafter 2009 FDIC SURVEY] (discussing statistical data
regarding national, state, and local banking rates).
36
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1. As the survey notes, this number may be an
underestimate because it does not account for “banked” household residents who do not
have an account in their name and do not benefit from a bank account owned by another
household resident.
37
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 17.
38
Most U.S. households (68.4 percent) were “fully banked” in 2017, meaning that the
household had a bank account and did not use AFS in the past twelve months. 2017 FDIC
SURVEY, infra note 2, at 1–2, 36. A total of 25.2 percent was unbanked and underbanked. Id.
The remaining 6.3 percent of U.S. households had a bank account, but information on their
use of AFS was insufficient to categorize the household as either underbanked or fully
banked (i.e., banked, underbanked status unknown). Id.
39
This compares with 28.3 percent or 68 million adults living in underbanked or unbanked
households in 2011. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2011/2011_
unbankedreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSL2-WTTK] [hereinafter 2011 FDIC SURVEY].
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The 2017 survey shows a decline in the unbanked rate “to the lowest
level since the survey began in 2009”; the underbanked number remains
largely constant.40 Only 6.5 percent of the population is unbanked, a record
low representing a significant improvement over the all-time high of 8.2
percent in 2011.41 The underbanked, or the number of U.S. households that
have a bank account, but do not use the banking system to meet transaction
or credit needs is relatively unchanged since the survey began in 2009 when it
was 7.6 percent.42 The survey showed 20.1 percent as underbanked in 2011.43
Underserved banking customers are excluded for a myriad of reasons
ranging from lack of geographic access and transparency to poor credit.44
Yet, the study’s demographics are enlightening, although not surprising.45
Minorities and LMI consumers are disproportionately represented in the
unbanked and underbanked categories.46 The 2017 survey confirms, as in the
past, that access to formal financial services is skewed towards whites and
the well-educated, while informal financial services are skewed towards
minorities and the less-educated.47 Geographically, there is more financial
exclusion in the southern part of the United States, whose demographics
encompass more people of color with less education.48
While the FDIC survey identifies that unbanked consumers do not use
bank accounts because of “lack of money,” academic research has yielded
more specificity. LMI consumers identified their preference for AFS based
on the simplicity and convenience of the products as well as the convenience
of “bank” hours and locations.49 The limited transaction services and lack of
40

See 2017 FDIC SURVEY, note 2, at 1 (reporting banking statistics for U.S. households).
Id. at 17.
42
Id.
43
2011 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 41, at 3. For official FDIC reports, surveys, and other
related documents, see Surveys & Data, ECONOMICINCLUSION.GOV, http://www.economic
inclusion.gov/surveys/ [https://perma.cc/6YZK-Q5HP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
44
Unbanked households reported not having a checking or savings accounts because they
did “[n]ot ha[ve] enough money to feel they need[ed] an account.” 2009 FDIC SURVEY,
supra note 37, at 11, 20–25.
45
The GAO Survey found that 17 percent of adults earning at least $45,000 per year were
banked and that 69% of unbanked consumers had a high school education or less. See U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 34, at 57–58 (offering a graph that displays these
numbers).
46
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 2.
47
2009 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 44, at 10–11.
48
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 22.
49
While some LMI consumers prefer AFS, the undertow of participating in that financial
system is the inability of LMI consumers to accumulate both short-and long-term savings.
Barr’s Study concludes: “[t]he results [of the study] suggest that existing financial services,
credit, and payment systems impose high transaction costs on lower-income households,
41
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savings services limit AFS providers from seeing the client as needing more
than a check cashing service. This highlights the need for banks to have the
appropriate products and services for this particular clientele.
1. Geographic Exclusion—Bank Deserts
“Bank deserts” are geographical areas without bank branches in a 10mile radius.50 The lack of access to banks also means a lack of access to
mainstream financial products, such as mortgages and small business loans,
savings accounts and lower-cost credit. To determine the presence of banking
deserts, zip codes are compared in terms of bank branches, race and ethnicity,
poverty, income, and population.51 Identifying a banking desert requires
integrating annual, geocoded data on bank branches from the FDIC with
tract-level data on household income and race from the 2000 census.52
Residents of banking deserts are then characterized according to the share of
the population which is low income, meaning annual income of $30,177 or
less (the bottom quartile in 2000 dollars) and majority-minority, meaning that
more than 50 percent of the population is Black or Hispanic.53
Common demographic characteristics define banking deserts,
whether located in urban or rural areas. A recent study examining postrecession bank closures evaluated the locations of FDIC-insured bank
branches in relation to U.S. Census Bureau data on households’ income
and race. Under this analysis, a banking desert is a “census tract[] in which
there are no bank branches within a 10-mile radius from the tracts’
centers.”54 Statistically, a banking desert has less than .02 branches per
1,000 residents, or less than one-tenth of the mean.55 The average poverty
increase their costs of credit, and reduce their opportunities to save.” MICHAEL S. BARR, NO
SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 8 (2012).
50
One study defined bank deserts as having .02 bank branches in an urban area per 1,000
residents, when the average is 10 times greater. Russell D. Kashian et al., Banking the
Unbanked: Bank Deserts in the United States 6, 8 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://swfa
2015.uno.edu/F_Banking/paper_90.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9WQ-LK25]. The designation of a
geographical area as a bank desert is based on the overlap between household income and race,
using U.S. Census Bureau data, and the location of FDIC-insured banks. Morgan et al., supra
note 28. There is a strong correlation between household income and race. Kashian et al.,
supra note 52, at 8–10.
51
Id. at 6–7.
52
Id. at 5.
53
“The maximum for this quartile is $49,626 in urban areas (inside a metropolitan statistical
area or MSA) and $46,095 in rural areas (outside an MSA).” Drew Dahl & Michelle Franke,
“Banking Deserts” Become a Concern as Branches Dry Up, REG’L ECONOMIST, Second
Quarter 2017, at 20.
54
Id.
55
Kashian et al., supra note 52, at 6.
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rate is higher than the overall average and average household per capita
income is lower.56 A separate study concluded that the disparity of urban
bank branch closings means “that residents of low-income census tracts
are eighty percent more likely to live in a banking desert than are residents
of higher-income tracts.”57 Similarly, rural areas disproportionately lost
more access to financial services.58
A further concern is how bank deserts might expand. A different study
projected the location of new deserts if existing, isolated bank branches close.59
Under this classification, merging the race and income identifiers with zip
codes, there were 1132 deserts in existence at the end of 2014, with a potential
for 1055 additional deserts.60 The location of future deserts is based on out-ofthe-way branches, or those outside the ten-mile range of any others.61 The
projected closures would specifically impact smaller, community banks.62
Bank deserts have a spillover effect; households and communities are
unable to leverage financial products and services to their advantage.
Accessing credit, such as mortgages and small business loans, builds wealth
of individuals and businesses and affects the economic mobility and the
economic development of a community.63 Particularly in LMI
neighborhoods, relationship banking or knowledge of the community is
crucial in lending decisions. Studies on relationship banking in LMI
neighborhoods have found that the presence of bank branches affects both
credit availability and positive loan performance.
The physical presence of a lender in the neighborhood mitigates risk
and expands credit availability.64 The presence of bank branches is a favorable
56

Id. at 8.
NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., BANK BRANCH CLOSURES FROM 2008-2016: UNEQUAL
IMPACT IN AMERICA’S HEARTLAND (2017), https://ncrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
NCRC_Branch_Deserts_Research_Memo_050517_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JFZ-G2UQ]
58
Id. at 10.
59
Dahl & Franke, supra note 55, at 20.
60
Id.
61
See generally Morgan et al., supra note 28, at 20 (describing “[b]ank desert expansion
and its impact on minority groups).
62
Dahl & Franke, supra note 55, at 20 (explaining that “branches in potential deserts are
small, with median deposits of $23 million in urban areas and $20 million in rural areas . . .
. [and] operated by small banks, with median total assets of $776 million in urban areas and
$317 million in rural areas”).
63
Cf. O. Emre Ergungor, Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in Low-to-Moderate
Income Neighborhoods 4, 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 06-16,
2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951197 [https://perma.cc/9BV6JP4D] (positing that for some borrowers in low-income neighborhoods, collection of soft
information is more meaningful than credit scores in assessing creditworthiness).
64
O. Emre Ergungor & Stephanie Moulton, Do Bank Branches Matter Anymore?, 13 ECON.
COMMENTARY 1, 5 (2011).
57
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indicator of the investment potential and entrepreneurship of a community as
well as the potential for more financial resources and opportunities.65
The lack of access created by banking deserts causes high transaction
costs for basic financial services. As discussed below, whether the pricing,
product design, and delivery offered to LMI consumers are appropriate for
their needs is a crucial area of inquiry in assessing financial exclusion.
2. Pricing, Product Design, and Delivery
In addition to geographical access, use of transaction banking services
for LMI consumers is also made more difficult due to product design,
delivery, and pricing. All consumers use the same payment system and have
credit needs. Broadening access to the formal banking economy requires
recognizing that the pricing, product design, and marketing of services that
have an appropriate, flexible quality will encourage actual usage.
Financial inclusion as it relates to product design encompasses both
usage and quality. Banks traditionally design products for households that
receive a moderate income on a regular basis.66 Financial providers and
products need to be specifically tailored to the needs of LMI consumers in
order to manage the risk of what is in essence a non-traditional borrower.67
65

See id. at 1 (arguing that especially in low and moderate-income neighborhoods, there is a
positive correlation between local bank branch access, and credit availability for small business
lending); see also Hoai-Luu Q. Nguyen, Do Bank Branches Still Matter? The Effect of
Closings on Local Economic Outcomes 1 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://economics.mit.edu/files/10143 [https://perma.cc/6TJY-3S8E] (examining the prolonged
negative effects of bank branch closings on credit supply to local small businesses).
66
Barr, supra note 51, at 4. The size and volume of the fringe banking industry continues to
expand, as described in a recent report, which notes:
According to a 2003 study by John P. Caskey, a Swarthmore College
economics professor, the number of check-cashing outlets grew from 1202
in 1986 to 16,689 in 1993. The annual revenues of ACE Cash Express, one
of the nation’s largest providers of alternative financial services, grew
nearly ten-fold in the decade from 1992 to 2002, from $26 million to just
shy of $230 million. According to industry figures, check-cashing outlets
now process nearly 180 million checks per year, with an estimated face
value of $55 billion.
NATIONAL CMTY. REINVESTMENT FUND, FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM, A GUIDE TO
BUILDING PRODUCTS AND STRATEGIES FOR UNDERBANKED MARKETS i (2008),
https://ncif.org/sites/default/files/free-publications/RFSI_StretegyGuide_Complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3DEG- BMRG].
67
Bank customer identification rules require including verification through the use of a
variety of well-established, permissible forms of identification. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220
(2020). These identification requirements necessary to open a transaction account exclude
some LMI consumers from having a basic deposit account or a savings account. See Barr,
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Financial exclusion is a problem of supply and demand with risk
assessment being a key component. Lenders segment markets according to
risk when designing products. The challenge of risk segmentation for higher
risk customers in a way that appropriately assesses risk, but is also transparent
and non-discriminatory, is two-fold.68
The supply and demand aspects of financial inclusion have micro and
macro aspects. Low-cost accounts, variety among financial service providers,
and governmental policies encouraging inclusion are all necessary to bring
the underserved into the formal banking economy.69 Finding the balance
between the costs of constructing the financial products which excluded
consumers need and the sustainability of those products is integral.
The paucity of adequate products and services demonstrates the
narrow aspects of the supply problem. Financial providers and products also
need to be specifically tailored to the needs of LMI consumers in order to
rebut the notion that banks are not for the poor. Monthly charges, minimum
balances, as well as overdraft fees and charges are costs and penalties that are
a part of product design.70 Product availability based on income, geographical
location of bank branches, and even lack of branch branches in
neighborhoods reinforce negative attitudes and stereotypes about the
availability of banks to LMI consumers.
Financial capability, or the knowledge, skill and confidence of
consumers, affects the demand for LMI consumer products. Individuals’
norms and beliefs affect their choices about using a transaction account or
establishing a formal banking relationship. Financial exclusion and isolation

supra note 3, at 184 (describing the impact of identity document requirements on low-income
immigrant communities); see also Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due:
What We Can Learn from the Banking and Credit Habits of Undocumented Immigrants,
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 1042 (explaining that undocumented immigrants are often
weary of formal banking institutions). I should add, however, that banks can and do require
information not required by the FDIC rules.
68
The first issue is how to not overly advantage low-risk customers, who benefit from a
positive presumption because of their account status or a personal relationship between the
banker and the customer. See Aluma Zernik, Overdrafts: When Markets, Consumers, and
Regulators Collide, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (2018).
69
See generally Allen et al., supra note 15 (discussing the role of financial inclusion policy
to broaden access for those financially excluded from the market).
70
There is no requirement that banks offer low-cost accounts to consumers, but the FDIC
initiated an optional Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program to encourage banks to offer profitable,
affordable small-dollar loans. FDIC Model Safe Accounts Pilot, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/ [https://perma.cc/38YD-DGME] (last updated
Apr. 25, 2012).
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occur because the norms and expectations of consumers are not met.71 Lack
of familiarity with appropriate financial products and services often results in
financial exclusion. LMI consumers are not able to make the best use of
available products when financial pressures occur if they are unaware of them.
Financial capability also encompasses the complexity of financial
products.72 The jargon, terms in fine print, and varying interest rates require
a level of financial judgment and understanding. Transparency and ease when
doing banking transactions are prerequisites for full participation in the
formal banking economy.73
Finally, whether race or risk is predominant in product pricing and
marketing by banks can be difficult to assess given the overlap of income and
race in this country. The lack of trust and aversion that minorities, regardless
of income, have towards the formal banking system is directly related to this
country’s sordid history of regulated, discriminatory lending.74 Admittedly,
banks incur increased delivery costs when providing affordable, inclusive
financial products. However, the effectiveness of a financial system is based
on the range of financial products for savings, credit, and risk management
offered as well as the wide range of people and businesses served.75 As
discussed below, to ignore the need for governmental regulation to create an

71
For background on why individuals might opt to use check cashing services instead of
formal banking accounts, see Gillian B. White, Why Poor People Make Expensive Financial
Decisions, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/
01/underbanked-servon/513542/ [https://perma.cc/4GEK-LZMJ] (reviewing Lisa Servon’s
book, which “explains how changes to both the banking system and the economy inhibited
many Americans from accessing basic necessities and building strong financial
foundations”); see also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow TM:
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S167
(2004) (outlining three reasons why households have difficulty saving: the difficulty of
determining the proper savings rate, lack of self-control, and procrastination).
72
For background on the “financial capability” as a framework, see generally FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH. INV’R EDUC. FDN., THE STATE OF U.S. FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: THE 2018
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPABILITY STUDY 1 (2019), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/down
loads/NFCS_2018_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/96ES-4XEA].
73
See Austin, supra note 6, at 1247–50 (discussing the cultural perceptions that low-income
consumers have regarding mainstream financial institutions).
74
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 997–98 (describing the disparities in credit access on the basis
of race and class that have emerged in communities where fringe lending is prevalent).
75
See generally Asli Demigruc-Kunt, Leora Klapper & Dorothe Singer, Financial Inclusion
and Inclusive Growth: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence 18–19 (World Bank Grp.
Policy Research Working Paper No. 8040, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958542&download=yes [https://perma.cc/2K7X-TMCK](finding
that, while financial inclusion is especially beneficial to the poorest income levels, that
advantage is directly tied to whether the financial infrastructure accommodates small
financial transactions).
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efficacious, inclusive financial system is to sanction the systematic
subordination that financial exclusion creates.76
B. Financial Exclusion as Economic Subordination
Access to credit is protected by prohibitions against discriminatory
conduct.77 What antidiscrimination laws do not guarantee is a right of access
to the formal banking sector. Those laws fail to address the systematic bias
and exclusion inherent in the formal banking economy. To the extent that the
banking regulatory system fails to provide access to even basic banking
services, it forces us to consider the systemic reasons why minorities who are
economically marginalized are consistently pushed into the informal banking
system. There is largely broad indifference to this state of affairs.
One explanation for the broad indifference that encourages fringe
banking and hampers financial inclusion is that there is societal discrimination
against blacks who are also often economically marginalized. Psychologists
argue that the persistence of social inequality is due to the way in which
dominant social groups protect existing advantages and disadvantages.78 SDT
enlightens the discussion on how the regulatory failure to promote and monitor
financial inclusion supports the disparate, two-tier banking system.79 Its group
rights approach is also instructive regarding individual discrimination.
Using SDT’s labeling, the banking regulatory system allows
mainstream banks to be financially exclusive. This makes mainstream
banking consumers and, implicitly, the regulatory framework, the dominant
group and fringe bank consumers are the subordinate group. The theory posits
that the society’s dominant group determines the economic and social
76
Franklin, supra note 15 (“[Poor and rural residents] report lower barriers in countries with
lower costs of accounts and greater penetration of financial service providers.”).
77
Fair lending laws guard against the bias that may occur in lending. The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) specifies several protected classifications that may not be the basis
for a credit decision, with the lender facing liability in compensatory and punitive damages.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018) The Fair Housing Act, (FHA) also establishes protected
classes in housing-related lending activities. The FHA, a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
makes it unlawful for any lender to discriminate against any persons because of their race,
color, religion, national origin, handicap, family status, or sex in the sale or rental of housing.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018).
78
See Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius & Shana Levin, Social Dominance Theory and The
Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 17 EUR. REV. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 271, 272 (2006) (theorizing that all societies tend to be structured into group-based
hierarchies from which power and authority are distributed based on legitimizing myths).
79
“Financial exclusion is deeply interrelated with social exclusion. . . . Those unable to
access finance for enterprise development or personal consumption have greater difficulties
in integrating socially and economically.” Lammermann, supra note 28, at 27.
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benefits that the society’s subordinate group will receive.80 Existing social
hierarchies result in a competitive dynamic that controls economic and social
benefits. The dominant group through oppositional asymmetric behavior
continually adjusts and redefines its power to adapt to the changing
conditions.81 By creating legitimizing myths, or “collective narratives,” the
dominant group allocates society’s goods and in doing so justifies group
domination and perpetuates inequalities.82
The legitimizing myth arising out of racial discrimination and
economic marginalization is that fringe banks provide sufficient financial
intermediation and access to the payments system. Characterizing the issue of
access to safe, reliable intermediation as one of individual choice, cultural
preferences, or market efficiency ignores the economic discrimination faced
by fringe bank consumers.83 The burden of the increased costs and risks of nonaccess are borne by those consumers.84 Access to effective intermediation is
both beneficial and essential because it is difficult, if not unmanageable, to
transact economic activities without access to suitable payment systems.
Financial inclusion quantifies the efficiency of a country’s payment
system. That efficacy depends on the diversity and depth of economic groups
served. The result is that in this country, access to the formal banking
economy is reserved for the society’s dominant group, while the society’s
subordinate group is relegated to the higher priced, less beneficial fringe
banking system. Upon examining the demographics, it becomes clear that the
social groups most subjected to financial exclusion are black and poor people.
The demographics of financial exclusion put race and class at the core
of unequal treatment. A disproportionate number of those outside the formal
economy are people of color.85 It is hard to ignore the impact of prior racial
80

Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, supra note 72, at 273. The dominant and subordinate groups are
based on age, gender, and arbitrarily socially constructed characteristics, such as race,
ethnicity, and class. Id.
81
Hierarchical societies have social value demarcations and distribute the society’s benefits
according to the groups’ ranking. Group members derive advantages and disadvantages
based solely on their placement. Dominant groups have positive social value, e.g., political
authority and power, while subordinate groups have negative social value, or low power. Id.
at 272.
82
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination:
A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 8 (2015).
83
Unlike in developing countries where financial inclusion is often needed to stabilize the
economy, in developed countries, financial inclusion is a byproduct of efficiency. Malaguti,
supra note 29, at 2.
84
See Eric Yaverbaum, Financial Exclusion: Why the Poor Get Poorer, HUFFPOST (Apr. 6,
2015, 8:15 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/financial-exclusion-why-the-poor_
b_7001914 [https://perma.cc/9L7T-42JZ] (“The average full-time worker without a bank
account can spend $40,000 over the course of his or her lifetime just to cash paychecks”).
85
2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 2–3.
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discrimination on the development of the two-tier system.86 This racially
disparate pattern of providing little to no alternative to fringe banking
contributes to the economic insecurity of people of color within the United
States. The troubling role of race as evidenced in the financial exclusion
statistics shows the impact that is felt by historically marginalized groups.
Thus, the failure of law and policy to ameliorate that exclusion is of concern.
Without a policy mandate, these consumers remain invisible to the deeply
established, highly competitive banking system.87
Banking law can enable or reduce social domination.88 In this instance, the
banking regulatory structure sustains the pre-existing group-based inequality by
not providing competitive financial intermediation or access to the payment
system for LMI consumers. The mainstream banking economy demonstrates that
competition alone does not provide the essential level of payment systems to all
segments of society. In fact, the regulatory scheme legitimizes anti-competitive
conduct by failing to provide suitable institutions for LMI consumers. United
States policy initiatives have not resulted in concrete measures that increase the
supply of accessible products, services or locales for fringe bank consumers.89
86
For example, a report describes “economic insecurity as a norm and security as an exception”
among retirees of color “just 8 percent of African-American senior households and only 4 percent
of Latino senior households are economically secure with sufficient resources to maintain a basic
standard of economic security throughout their projected life expectancy.” TATJANA MESCHEDE,
LAURA SULLIVAN & THOMAS SHAPIRO, THE CRISIS OF ECONOMIC INSECURITY FOR AFRICANAMERICAN AND LATINO SENIORS 2 (2011), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files
/publications/IASP%20Demos%20Senior%20of%20Color%20Brief%20September%202011.p
df [https://perma.cc/L5W6-6W2U]. See also Laura Sullivan et al., Equitable Investments in the
Next Generation: Designing Policies to Close the Racial Wealth Gap, CFED (2016),
https://prosperitynow.org/sites/default/files/resources/IASP_CFED_Equitable_Investments_in_
the_Next_Generation-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3UB-PJEP]; Amy Traub, Laura Sullivan,
Tatjana Meschede & Tom Shapiro, The Asset Value of Whiteness: Understanding the Racial
Wealth Gap, DEMOS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.demos.org/publication/asset-value-whitenessunderstanding-racial-wealth-gap [https://perma.cc/GD88-ZFVT].
87
See generally, Cassandra Jones Havard, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When
Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1057, 1061–71 (2001)
(arguing that consumers who are invisible to the traditional banking system are forced into
predatory and sub-prime loans which do not accurately price their credit risk).
88
As one scholar posits:
Law is an important instrument of social domination. Constitutional law
doctrines, for example, make it extremely difficult for persons of color
to challenge racial discrimination, but impose few barriers for whites
who wish to contest the legality of racial egalitarian remedies.
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position: Social
Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 32 (2014).
89
The FDIC has endorsed small dollar loans as a viable bank product. See FDIC Model Safe
Accounts Pilot, supra note 67. The regulatory agencies theoretically allow federally insured
institutions to offer deposit advance loans as an alternative to payday loans. See 78 Treas.
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Access to basic banking services unfairly advantages those who
readily have them while disadvantaging those who are affected by
systematic anti-competitive conduct.90 If the limited access to mainstream
banking services is viewed as an exercise of monopoly power, the
anticompetitive dynamic of the fringe banking sector is more visible.
Indubitably, the regulatory void stridently endorses the structurally unfair and
noncompetitive two-tiered banking framework.
The two-tier banking system is anticompetitive in at least two ways.
First, fringe banking consumers have “barriers to entry.”91 The formal
banking economy is less attractive to fringe bank consumers because of the
risks and size of the investment to enter the market. Product design makes it
expensive for fringe bank consumers to invest in the formal banking economy
compared to the return on their investment. Risk analyses that are more
appropriate for higher-income sector customers should be replaced with the
type of nonstandardized risk analysis appropriate for fringe bank consumers
making this transition.92 Requiring standardization on disclosure
transparency, sustainability, appropriate risk evaluations and consumer
protection are the type of minimal requirements that are not only beneficial
but should be the norm for consumers transitioning into the formal
economy.93 Allowing consumer choice and monitoring regulatory costs
Reg. 70624 (2013); 78 Treas. Reg. 70552 (2013).The regulations make the products unduly
restrictive. To qualify for a deposit advance loan, the customer must 1) have a deposit
account with the bank for at least six months and 2) not have delinquent or adversely
classified credits. See 78 Treas. Reg. at 70629; see also 78 Treas. Reg. at 70556.
90
Although “[s]ocial dominance theory's key insight is its emphasis on the individual-level
forces that contribute to the perpetuation of group-based social hierarchies.” Michelle
Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 1089, 1108 (2002). The theory is used by analogy in this Article as a way of explaining
the collective failure of law and policy to recognize how the inequality among social groups
results in a noncompetitive banking environment for LMI consumers.
91
“Barriers to entry,” which can include governmental regulation, are anticompetitive
measures that disrupt other firms from entering a market that is dominated by a firm in the
market earning competitive prices. Caskey, supra note 8, at 150.
92
Relationship lending, which is popular in microfinance, uses nontraditional factors,
including “soft” information to assess risk. See generally Craig R. Everett, Group
Membership, Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social
Lending, 7 BANKING & FIN. REV. 15, 15 (2015).
93
The CFPB has authority to review financial product to ensure that they are fair, transparent
and competitive. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2018) (authorizing the CFPB to “implement and,
where applicable, enforce federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and
services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent,
and competitive”); see also Norman I. Silber, Reasonable Behavior at the CFPB, 7 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 104 (2012) (discussing the expansiveness of the CFPB’s role is
in protecting consumers).
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should stimulate competition in the market.94 Second, fringe banking forces
a “lock-out.” The structure of the informal economy is self-perpetuating in
that it undermines customers’ ability to move into the formal banking
sector.95 There is ineffective competition from mainstream banks to provide
services to fringe bank customers which by default encourages fringe banking
consumers to enter the informal banking system and arguably keeps them
there. However, while having a number of providers in a market is a
necessary condition for effective competition, a robust market does not assure
automatically that the market is effectively competitive for customers.
Individual consumers do not have a legal right to challenge the
regulatory structure that excludes them.96 Essentially, fringe bank consumers
have an absence of choice.97 The ineffective competition to provide services
to fringe bank customers raises problems with supply. The lack of diversity
among fringe bank providers, when left unchallenged, deters potential
entrants from entering the market. Fringe banks can then raise prices, limit
quality, or restrict product availability.98 Moreover, to the extent that the
94

Fringe bank customers need nonstandardized risk analysis instead of risk assessments which
are appropriate for higher-income sector customers. Shahram Sharifi & G. Michael Flores,
Options for Short-Term Credit in the United Kingdom 13–15 (May 4, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259542 [https://perma.cc/
P5BD-9ETE] (discussing the higher costs of offering bank products to LMI consumers).
95
Access to transaction accounts leads to the necessary information for lenders to assess
creditworthiness. To the contrary, the structure of the fringe banking market “undermines
consumers’ access to alternative low-cost credit.” Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006); see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 666
(describing fringe loans as “go[ing] up a descending escalator—the fringe customer has to
fight hard just to stay in place, and stopping for breath means a ride to the bottom.”).
96
In the United States, unlike in the European Union, there is no right to a basic bank
account. American consumers who are financially excluded have no way to remedy their
financial exclusion without laws that change the regulatory structure as discussed in Part
III. See, e.g., Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
July 2014 on the Comparability of Fees Related to Payment Accounts, Payment Account
Switching and Access to Payment Accounts with Basic Features, 2014 O.J. (L 257), 214,
246. This Article makes the case that consumers should be guaranteed free access to basic
payment services, including the ability to save funds and withdraw cash.
97
Fringe bank consumers cannot gain access traditional banking services through their own
efforts by building credit using fringe services. Roger Swagler, John Burton & Joan Koonce
Lewis, The Alternative Financial Sector: An Overview, 7 ADVANCING CONSUMER INT. 7, 9
(1995) (explaining that borrowers who pay off obligations to fringe lenders do not see an
improvement in their credit record because such transactions are not part of their formal credit
history).
98
Fringe banks structure products as to evade usury and consumer protection laws. Lynne
Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace:
The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury
Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 590, 626–37 (2000).
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regulatory scheme fails to require individual banks to measure and improve
financial inclusion, it perpetuates the monopolistic fringe bank market.99
Admittedly, the banking sector is a private, profit-making enterprise.
As the recent financial crisis makes clear, there is substantial government
support for the industry. The recent Wall Street Bailout, the powerful and
effective banking lobby, and heretofore lax regulation of the AFS are direct
and indirect displays of government support.100 Likewise, government has an
obligation to level the playing field for economically vulnerable consumers.
A robust regulatory system intervenes where necessary to change incentives
in the markets while using aggressive enforcement tools to deter
inappropriate behavior.101
Maintenance of an efficacious financial system is a compelling
governmental interest. Similarly, financial inclusion raises a single question:
Should all citizens be given access to a reliable, safe payments system? The
continued denial of an economic advantage tied to a compelling
governmental interest sanctions the policy void that keeps the unbanked and
underbanked out of the financial mainstream.
The existing two-tier financial system does not provide fringe bank
consumers with effective intermediation. The role of the Federal Reserve, as
the architect of the payment system, requires examination. As discussed
below in Part II, efficient, affordable, access to the payment system is the
premise for arguing that access to the formal banking sector is a public good.
II. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT OF BANKING
Payment systems, which include the settlement and dispersion of
funds, are the basis for monetary exchange in an economy. This financial
infrastructure is crucial to facilitating access to financial services and the safe
transfer of funds. Payment systems are also a critical component of directing
relevant information in risk assessment. Currently, banks dominate the
payment system, which is regulated by the Federal Reserve. As the central
bank, the Federal Reserve regulates both the monetary policy and the public
functions of banking. Fringe bank consumers currently have access to the
payment system though high costs servicers. The question becomes whether
99
See discussion infra Part IV (arguing for a financial inclusion measurement as a part of a
bank’s annual CRA exam).
100
Most AFS providers are regulated at the state level, but the CFPB has limited authority to
regulate some of the credit products regardless of the state’s regulatory authority. See
generally Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 84 Fed. Reg.
4252 (Feb. 14, 2019) (discussing, in part, CFPB regulation of payday lenders).
101
Financial Services Authority, Production Intervention 27–28, 42 (Discussion Paper No.
11/1, 2011) (U.K.).
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the financial infrastructure and regulatory policy can and should be adjusted
to accommodate the needs of and provide competitive access to banks’
transaction accounts for fringe bank consumers.
A. The Fiscal-Financial Linkage
Traditionally, the financial system and overall economy depend on the
unique functions that banks provide. Banks historically have provided three
essential fiscal functions: (1) providing a reliable payment system by issuing
transaction accounts; (2) maintaining financial stability throughout the economy
as a back-up source of liquidity and (3) facilitating monetary policy.102 For this
reason, banks are often labeled as “special.”103 In the financial sector, banks are
a unique public-private hybrid: privately owned, but requiring permission for a
charter; highly regulated with explicit conditions on their business activities.104
Banks are an integral part of the fiscal and financial linkages in a
market-capitalist economy. The underlying policy of the banking regulatory
structure is public trust. The integrated functions and essential linkages
between the fiscal and financial sectors cause concern for the central bank.
Payment processing, financial stability, and monetary stability are economic
risks that the Federal Reserve as the central bank oversees to keep the
economy functioning well.

102

Banks provide a safe and liable payments system, Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code along with federal statutes, and regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System govern the mechanism of the bank payments process. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010 (2018) (Expedited Funds Availability Act); id. §§ 5001–5018 (Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act); 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2020) (Availability of Funds and
Collection of Checks).
103
See, e.g., E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS
SPECIAL? (1983) https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/are-banks-special
[https:// perma.cc/8Z8Y-64F6].
104
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 203 (describing, for instance, the powers of the FDIC to install a
Conservator to take control of a bank in certain scenarios). Bank dominance of the payment
system can have a domino effect in case of bank failure. See Edward E. Furash, Banks are
Obsolete—and Who Cares, 1 N.C. BANK. INST. 1, 8 (1997) (describing how a loss at one
institution immediately affects the solvency of other institutions and the financial system).
The inter-relatedness of bank and nonbank financial intermediaries increases the potential of
systemic failure. See Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy
Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 72–73 (2015)
(concluding that mitigating systemic risk requires individual financial institutions to go
beyond contract immunities to protect against domino risk).
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1. Payment Processing
Banks operate the payment system that allows parties to establish
transaction accounts.105 They provide consumers with a safe place for
deposits, savings, payment processing as well as short- and long-term
credit. Banks provide businesses with back-up credit lines. They also
facilitate the economy by providing a way to process payments, distribute
currency.106
Depositors provide banks with the funds needed to operate and are
protected by deposit insurance. Deposits are liabilities on the bank’s
balance sheet that must be paid on demand. Banks use those deposits to
make loans, which are assets with a long-term repayment. The bank’s
capital covers the risk of loan loss and provides a cushion of liquid assets
sufficient to preserve depositors’ confidence that any withdrawal demands
will be met.107
Deposit insurance provides protection that gives depositors
confidence. It also provides monitoring of the institution’s solvency that
individual depositors find too costly.108 The FDIC, created in response to
bank runs during the 1932 Depression, guarantees a return of deposit
liabilities in case of bank failure.109 That governmental protection is
crucial in preserving financial stability by providing building consumer
trust in banks. Banks further benefit in that traditional deposit insurance
is subsidized by the federal government and governmental intervention,
when needed, is an appropriate remedy.

105

The increased interlinkages of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries that participate
in payment systems increase the risk exposure throughout the financial system. As one
commentator said, “I see little to be gained by insisting that banks always be the only type
of entity that can provide such services.” Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Bank of Eng.,
Remarks at the Seminar on Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy in a World of Global
Capital Markets (Jan. 29, 1997), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/
19970129.htm [https://perma.cc/D6C5-ERBB].
106
The Federal Reserve through its regulation of banks has the responsibility to maintain a
sound banking system and a healthy economy by raising and lowering interest rates, which
both manages consumer demand and monitors financial stability. Troy S. Brown, Legal
Political Moral Hazard: Does the Dodd- Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. &
C.L. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2012).
107
See Gerard Gennotte & David Pyle, Capital Controls and Bank Risk, 5 J. BANK. & FIN.
805, 805 (1991) (defining bank capital).
108
Congress created the FDIC in 1932 as a part of the Glass-Stegall Act, which put in place
extensive regulatory reforms. See generally Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66,
48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)).
109
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1821 (2018) (describing the creation of the FDIC and the
function of FDIC insurance funds).
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2. Financial Stability
Historically, banks have been a separate, distinct, highly regulated
industry within financial markets.110 In a modern economic system, banks
are essential to economic growth because they provide credit and allocate
resources.111 The deregulation of financial institutions allowed banks to
expand into other financial markets, such as securities, funds management
and insurance, and created other types of financial institutions, e.g.,
private equity groups.112 It is the financial stability of these integrated
markets that provides the argument that access to the banking system is a
public good.
a. Integrated Financial Markets
Financial crises are prevalent, though controlled, in modern market
economies.113 Central banks are crucial to restoring financial stability and
protecting the entire economic system from insolvency. The recent global
financial crisis that began in the American subprime mortgage market
required central banks to take individual and concerted actions to stabilize
the global economy.114 The Federal Reserve’s response to the financial
crisis resulted in the imposition of conventional policy actions––fiscal
stimulus, closing of financial institutions, and capital injections into
financial institutions––as well as unconventional policy actions, like
providing direct support to important financial markets, lending to

110

See Prasad Krishnamurthy, George Stigler on His Head: The Consequences of
Restrictions on Competition in (Bank) Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 823, 850 (2018)
(critiquing banking regulation as creating a false tradeoff between competition and risk and
recommending that deposit insurance be structured in a way that eliminates risk-taking).
111
See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Banks and Economic Growth: Implications
from Japanese History, 45 J.L. & ECON. 127, 130–31 (2002) (discussing the role of banks in
the development of transitional and developed economies).
112
See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 39, 44 (2011) (arguing that restrictive banking regulations such as the Volcker
Rule ignore modern finance and new banking market participants).
113
See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit The Fed: Central Bank
Independence In An Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43–44, 45 (2016) (describing
the Federal Reserve’s role as an independent central bank in mitigating the frequency and
severity of financial and economic crises).
114
See Kara M. Westercamp, A Crack in the Facade and the Whole Building Came Tumbling
Down: A Critical Examination of the Central Banks’ Response to the Subprime Mortgage Loan
Crisis and Global Financial Market Turmoil, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 233
(2009) (discussing the interventionist role of central banks during a liquidity crisis).
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nonbank institutions and investors, as well as purchasing securities not
typically held in central bank portfolios.115
The interlinkages of large banks in the economic system required
government intervention during the recent financial crisis to prevent a
massive collapse of the country’s economic system. Similarly, the solvency
of financial markets became dependent on whether governmental
intervention would shore up financial institutions.116 In this way, the fiscal
or economic sector and the financial sector became indistinguishably
interconnected. To the extent that fiscal and macroeconomic policies are
crafted based on their effect on financial markets, economic policy is
driving financial regulation and vice versa. Consequently, the regulation of
the financial sector has become dependent on the health of the underlying
national economy.117
b. Maturity Transformation and the Repurchase Market
Maturity transformation is at the heart of modern banking. The presence
of maturity transformation—borrowing short to lend long—depends on
investors having confidence in the banking system.118 Investment banks finance
themselves with short-term debt or “repo”119 using large amounts of available
cash to earn short-term interest. The collateral for these loans are securitized
assets, such as mortgages, with long payment terms. Using long-term assets to

115

GORDON H. SELLON, JR., FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY—AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2009 ECONOMIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM xxiii, xxiv (2009),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/introduction-2009.pdf
[perma.cc/D2T3-5JM].
116
See, e.g., Bear Stearns Company Profile, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/b/bear-stearns.asp [perma.cc/DE2D-CWFS] (last updated Oct. 4, 2019) (describing
the collapse of Bear Stearns and subsequent support from the Federal Reserve).
117
Y.V. Reddy, Financial Sector Regulation and Macroeconomic Policy 33 (Bank for Int’l
Settlements Working Paper No. 62, 2012), https://www.cafral.org.in/sfControl/content/ Doc
umentFile/1219201344602PM_BP62_%2009_Paper_by_Y_V_Reddy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EX7M-VZZV].
118
As explained by one article, “maturity transformation” involves “the bank transform[ing]
short-term, highly liquid liabilities like deposits into illiquid assets like bank loans to
businesses, and these bank loans are critical to fueling economic growth. Without government
regulation, however, the ‘maturity mismatch’ inherent in maturity transformation makes such
a bank highly vulnerable to runs.” John C. Dugan, Addressing the Fundamental Banking
Policy Problem of Runs: Effectively Subordinating Large Amounts of Long-Term Debt to
Short-Term Debt to End "Too-Big-to-Fail,” 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 11, 13 (2018)
118
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future
of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237, 254–55 (1992) (discussing the history and
function of repurchase agreements, or “repos”).
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finance short-term debt creates a maturity mismatch.120 During the subprime
crisis, there was a “repo run” when investors became uncertain about the value
of the underlying collateral.121
The risky process of maturity transformation depends to a large extent
on investors having confidence in the payments system. Nonbank financial
institutions, sometimes called shadow banks, pose a significant risk to the
monetary system.122 “Lightly regulated,” these institutions are “deeply reliant
on uninsured short-term debt that pose [sic] significant risk.”123 It is the
systemic risk in the short-term lending market that can threaten the financial
stability of a nation’s economy, making central bank guarantees necessary to
shore up that market.124 Central banks help to contain contagion effects which
occur when investors withdraw short-term wholesale funding on which many
large financial firms and shadow banks rely.125 During the global financial

120
Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the Problem
of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 239–40 (2012).
121
Fed Scholars: A Run on the Repurchase Market Caused the Financial Crisis and Will
Probably Happen Again, REPOWATCH (May 23, 2011), https://repowatch.org/2011/05/23/fedscholars-a-run-on-the-repurchase-market-caused-the-financial-crisis-and-will-probably-hap
pen-again [perma.cc/SJG9-Y6XN].
122
Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, defined “shadow banking” as “a
diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional banking
functions—but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the traditional system of
regulated depository institutions.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Some
Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response, Russell Sage Foundation & Century
Foundation Conference on “Rethinking Finance” (Apr. 13, 2012).
123
THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BANKING IN THE SHADOWS 5 (2016),
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedB
usinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf [perma.cc/U55V-K2N9].
124
One commentator made the following observation: “After four years of efforts, regulators
and the financial firms with the most at stake have failed to extinguish systemic risk in a
crucial short-term lending market,” the repurchase market, “that greases the wheels of trading
in U.S. Treasuries.” Liz McCormick, In Market That Ensnared Lehman, Risk of Debt Fire
Sales Lingers, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201605-25/in-repo-market-that-ensnared-lehman-risk-of-fire-sale-lingers [perma.cc/6P6Z-N4EQ].
125
Problems in the wholesale market arguably still exist. One government study found: “Data
gaps persist in securities financing transactions, including repo and securities lending. The
markets for these critical short-term funding instruments remain vulnerable to runs and asset fire
sales. Yet comprehensive data on so-called bilateral repo and securities lending transactions are
scant.” Richard Berner, Dir., Office of Fin. Research, Remarks by Office of Financial Research
Director Richard Berner at the Third Annual Workshop on Financial Interconnectedness (Apr.
12, 2016); see also PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS & BNY MELLON, THE FUTURE OF
WHOLESALE FUNDING MARKETS 13 (2015), https://www.bnymellon.com/_globalassets/pdf/our-thinking/the-future-of-wholesale-funding-markets.pdf [perma.cc/6FKR-LMQC]
(describing the repo market as the “circulatory system” and stressing its reliance on the “smooth
transfer of collateral.”).
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crisis, central banks protected investment banks from the threat of contagion
or a run on bank assets.126
Regulatory policies are likewise designed to ensure against
financial instability.127 Underlying the “Too Big to Fail Doctrine” is the
need for stability in the banking system and in the nation’s monetary
economy. Disruptions to the payment system destroy the confidence that
the markets need to operate. Infusing the capital needed to stabilize the
economy is among the primary reasons that central banks exist. The chief
concern is that financial strain creates adverse consequences for the real
economy. Thus, crises in financial systems have demonstrated the close
linkage between financial stability and the health of the economy.128
The global financial crisis highlighted the need for financial
regulations aimed at maintaining financial stability.129 The need for
regulatory change was systemic risk in capital markets.
Changes are mandated both inside and outside of the banking
system in order to enhance financial stability and strengthen the market.130
Changes to a regulatory structure occur because regulators incentivize
certain discretionary behavior or mandate compliance. In this way,
regulatory change is both incentive-based and information-based. The
onus is on institutions to identify accurately and manage the inherent
operational risks. For example, current regulations require certain

126

See generally Filippo Occhino, Central Bank Lending in a Liquidity Crisis, 2 ECON.
COMM. 1 (2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1a3c/ae877f9beab47b82ec03a10fe30391
dedf08.pdf?_ga=2.187037288.1176492533.1578258461-32191665.1578258461 [https://
perma.cc/XCQ2-CN3N] (“[T]o prevent the liquidity crisis from developing into a much
more costly economic and financial crisis, the central bank needs to provide liquidity to the
banks that would be solvent under normal economic conditions . . . .”).
127
See Howard Davis, Banking and the State: Changing the Social Contract, Remarks at
Barclay’s Bank 6 (2008), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21466 [perma.cc/YH5C-T77C] (arguing
that solution to the credit crisis is integrated regulation).
128
One economist makes a distinction between “monetary stability” and “financial stability.”
The former refers to the stability of the general price level, while the latter refers “to the
stability of the key institutions and markets that go to make up the financial system.” Andrew
Crockett, Why Is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy?, 82 ECON. REV. 5, 6 (1997).
129
See generally, e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE
RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189
_dec2010.pdf [perma.cc/2JMX-M75S] (presenting the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision’s reforms on the issues of maintaining bank liquidity and resiliency).
130
Jerome H. Powell, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., The Federal
Reserve’s Framework for Monitoring Financial Stability: Remarks at the Economic Club of
New York (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bis.org/review/r181129a.pdf [perma.cc/5L6B-73H2].
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financial institutions to create a resolution plan that becomes operational
if they fail.131
Central banking is premised on maintaining financial stability. As
evidenced in the subprime crisis, extreme and adverse economic conditions
warrant the Federal Reserve’s setting policies and adjusting interest rates to
protect the banking system's capacity to meet the credit needs of households
and businesses. Maintaining the integrated relationship between private
sector banking and the federal government leads to a financially stable
banking and well-functioning financial system.
Undoubtedly, the Federal Reserve’s role in maintaining economic
stability is a critical one. The interrelatedness of financial markets affects
financial stability and raises concerns about aspects of financial stability and
economic risks which were unknown before the subprime crisis. The linkage
between systemic stability and the solvency of individual institutions affects
price and monetary stability to avoid a spillover into the entire economy.
3. Monetary Stability
Monetary stability, or the strength of pricing levels, overlaps with and is
distinguishable from financial stability. Monetary stability policy determines
how to measure inflation, sets inflation rates, and determines the permanency of
prices by measuring inflation rate or price level.132 On the other hand, financial
stability refers to the confidence that the public must have in both financial
institutions and the markets.133 One of several significant linkages between the
131

The regulatory framework now requires the largest banks to have higher capital and
liquidity levels and to conduct stress-tests and create living wills. Dodd-Frank Act §165, 12
U.S.C.§ 5365 (2018).
132
As Loretta Mester explains,
Monetary policy mainly works through its ability to affect current and
expected future interest rates; however, in certain circumstances, it also
has the ability to affect risk-taking by investors and financial institutions,
and thereby is linked to financial stability. I believe that, in general, the
goals of monetary policy and financial stability are complementary. For
example, price stability helps businesses, households, and financial
institutions make better decisions, thereby fostering the stability of the
financial system. And a stable financial system allows for more effective
transmission of monetary policy throughout the economy.
Loretta J. Mester, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Clev., Five Points About
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, Sveriges Riksbank Conference on Rethinking the
Central Bank’s Mandate 2 (June 4, 2016), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/
speeches/sp-20160604-five-points.aspx [https://perma.cc/SYB8-XKX4] (footnote omitted).
133
George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crisis: A Taxonomy and Review 52 (Loyola
Univ. of Chi. Working Paper, No. 1999-12, 1999), https://ideas.repec.org/p/dnb/staffs/
48.html [https://perma.cc/JC5A-5VK6].
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two is that institutions remain solvent and operate without interference from
regulators, and those markets operate without short-term price fluctuations.
The financial system is particularly fragile to market failure, justifying
public policy intervention because of the widespread economic harm that can
result. Excessive volatility in prices in financial markets has the potential to
create instability at financial institutions. Yet, the instability in asset prices at
financial institutions that causes investment losses does not warrant market
intervention without evidence of market failure.
Banks need sound macroeconomic policies.
The type of
macroeconomic policies that sustain low inflation, while also encouraging
economic growth, facilitate the efficient delivery of financial services and the
safety and soundness of financial institutions.134 The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) gives the Federal Reserve complete policy making control
over the money supply.135 Through open market operations, the Federal Reserve
attempts to sustain economic growth and stabilize the money supply.136
The banking system remains the principal way in which central banks, in
general, and the Federal Reserve, specifically, implement monetary policy.137
Financial and economic stability combine efficiency and competition. The Federal
Reserve’s role as a central bank is to create the needed elasticity directly and
indirectly by setting the market prices and structure.138 Flexibility in market
pricing, as dictated by supply and demand conditions affect the solvency of
institutions, their profitability and potentially their failure. The central bank’s role

134

For instance, “one cannot help but notice that the most severe problems in our banking
and thrift industries during the 1980s stemmed from serious macroeconomic imbalances––
including the accelerating inflation of the late 1970s and the costly but necessary steps to
reverse that trend in the 1980s.” Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr., supra note 105.
135
See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Conducting Monetary
Policy, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 35–41 (10th ed. 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/327P-4KHJ].
136
Congress created the Federal Reserve System to reduce the risk of failures in the banking
industry Over time, the Federal Reserve’s regulatory power extended to regulating the money
supply. By buying and selling of government securities on the “open market,” it increases
and decreases the supply of money that is available for lending. Id.
137
For example, the Federal Reserve regulates banks and the money supply through reserve
requirements, which control banks’ market participation. Specifically, the Federal Reserve,
and other central banks, control short-term interest rates by manipulating the required
reserves to satisfy banks’ demand. Banks can demand reserves only when they meet reserve
requirements and access requires meeting funds management rules See 12 U.S.C. 461(b)(2)
(2018) (requiring depository institutions to maintain specific levels of reserves).
138
For more on the role of central banks, see generally Mester, supra note 132, at 13–14
(making the point that “structural resiliency tools” can help central banks ensure stability).
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is to permit market flexibility in pricing, while mediating price instability so that it
does not damage consumer confidence and economic activity.139
Central banking, arguably, creates a social contract between the banking
system, regulators, and the government. As discussed below, the payments system
is a crucial part of financial infrastructure used to facilitate financial stability and
to mitigate financial crises by reducing settlement risks. The inter-linkages with
financial markets and the Federal Reserve’s role in monitoring price stability is an
acknowledged relationship between private sector banking and the federal
government. That critical involvement also establishes the public nature of banks
and banking and underlies the argument that access to banking is a public good.140
B. Financial Intermediation as a Public Function
1. Financial Intermediation
The financial and economic viability of consumers depends on navigating
the increasingly complex banking environment.141 Banks, historically, are the
leaders in financial intermediation, using deposit accounts to fund consumer and
commercial loans through maturity transformation. Understanding how privately
owned banks use public resources in financial intermediation to make profits
raises fundamental issues about who should have access to banks.
Central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, license banks to create
142
money. They also are responsible for payments system infrastructure used for
check clearing, and holding banks’ reserve accounts.143 When deposit-withdrawal
139
For more on the role of central banks, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., supra note 135, at 23–32 (describing how the federal reserve conducts monetary
policy to stabilize the economy and level of prices).
140
See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What
Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
453, 478 (2016) (describing the specialness of private banks as public franchises dispensing
public credit); see also Piotr Masiukiewicz, Doctrine of Public Good in Banking Versus State
Intervention 2–3 (Institute of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 38.2014, 2014), http://
www.badania-gospodarcze.pl/images/Working_Papers/2014_No_38.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WCU9-DYXJ] (arguing that the degree of state regulation of banking provides evidence that
it is treated as a public good).
141
Lawrence B. Lindsay, The CRA as a Means to Provide Public Goods, in REVISING THE CRA:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 160, 165 (Prabal
Chakrabarti et al. eds., 2009), https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/cra_
means_provide_public_goods.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGQ4-J58P].
142
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 135, at 41–42 (outlining the
tools central banks use to achieve the targeted federal funds rate).
143
See Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, The Chicago Plan Revisited (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 12/202, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12 202.pdf
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demands exceed the amount in the central bank reserve account, the bank can
make an overnight interbank loan from the central bank or other banks to meet the
reserve requirement.144 The back-up liquidity from the central bank allows banks
to both allocate credit through loans and facilitate payments through the payments
system.145 The same functions that arguably make banks “special,” back-up
liquidity and the payments system, are key to how they dispense credit.
Banks are the intermediaries of borrowers and savers. They provide
payment services, guarantee deposits, and create credit, using other people’s
money. These functions, also essential to a viable economy, demonstrate the
importance of banking to the economy. While consumers appear to voluntarily
choose fringe banks and their products and services, lack of access to the formal
banking economy creates challenges and generates additional concerns.
Specifically, failure to participate in the formal banking economy means forsaking
the primary way to enter the financial mainstream. Using the formal banking
economy allows consumers to build wealth, acquire assets, and establish credit. If
access to the formal banking economy is not widened, LMI consumers are not
given the benefit of these public policy choices designed for the entire society’s
benefit.146
a. The Theory of Public Goods
A public good is one that is needed for the public welfare, but is not
provided by the private marketplace because it is not profitable.147 In economic

[https://perma.cc/728M-N5BG] (discussing how the Chicago Plan required 100% backing of
deposits by government-issued money to eliminate bank runs); Ulrich Bindseil, The Operational
Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve Position Doctrine (European Cent.
Bank, Working Paper No. 372, 2004), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp
372.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPD-J52Y]; Piti Disyatat, Monetary Policy Implementation:
Misconceptions and Their Consequences 2–4 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No.
269, 2008), https://www.bis.org/publ/work269.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN7C-RQ7L].
144
Banks facing a liquidity crisis that are members of the Federal Reserve may borrow from
the Fed’s Discount window. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 248(i)-(j) (2018). Interbank
lending among insured depository institutions is regulated under 12 U.S.C. §371b-2, and
includes “credit and liquidity risks, including operational risks, related to intraday and interday transactions.” 12 C.F.R. §206.2(d).
145
See IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY AND THE PUBLIC DEBT 15–17 (2009) (ebook) (discussing
the instability of demand deposits as a source of loans).
146
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) (describing how bank investments may be accepted as
public funds); see also Michael P. Malloy, Principles of Bank Regulation 496 (3rd ed. 2011)
(discussing whether the Community Reinvestment Act was effective in increasing the
availability of banking services to low-income communities).
147
See Lindsay, supra note 141, at 160 (discussing the concept of a public good in the
context of the CRA).
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terms, a “good” must be something of value which is productive.148 In order for a
good to be characterized as a public good, it must have two specific characteristics:
(1) non-rivalrous and (2) non-excludable.149 To be a non-rivalrous good, anyone
should be able to consume the good without a cost to others. To be a nonexcludable good, no one can be excluded from consuming it. The “publicness” of
the good means that there can be simultaneous availability allowing more than one
individual access to the good.150
While government creates most public goods, such as first responders and
public schools, the government can sanction private parties to create goods for
public consumption.151 When public goods are created by a private entity, the
inherent conflict is the need for an unlimited supply. The underlying
competitiveness of the private market is at odds with the unlimited availability that
is the very nature of public goods.152
Economists disagree on whether public goods are more efficiently
produced in the public sector. One theory posits that government produced public
goods are the most efficient.153 It is premised on the idea that market failure has
resulted in non-production and government expenditures are needed to produce
the good.154 The other theory argues that private production of public goods may
be more efficient. The premise is that market preferences may be undervalued, yet
the goods still needed.155 The distinction is made to separate the justification for
why a good is needed and the public expenditure of funds from whether a public
or private party produces the good.156 Indeed, maximizing the public welfare
should be sufficient justification for the support and legitimacy of public goods.
148
Piotr Masiukiewicz, Doctrine of Public Good in Banking Versus State Intervention 3 (Inst.
of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 38, 2014), http://www.badania-gospodarcze.pl/images/
Working_Papers/2014_No_38.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SPS-F69S].
149
J. M BUCHMAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 49 (1968).
150
Joseph P. Kalt, Public Goods and The Theory of Government, 1 CATO J. 565, 567 (1981).
151
Randall G. Holcombe, A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON.
1, 2–4 (1997).
152
See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
153
Holcombe, supra note 151, at 4.
154
See generally id.
155
James M. Buchanan, Public Finance and Public Choice, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 383, 386
(1975); see also Holcombe, supra note 151, at 12 (giving examples of private production of
goods which are nonexcludable, like public goods).
156
A different economic perspective completely negates the public goods theory and instead
argues that the contractarian model of government is preferable. By contrasting Rawls’
presumed social contract created by consensus with Nozick’s minimalist state intervention
and Buchanan’s “constitutional contract,” political economist Scott Gordan posits that there
are not clear entitlements to the public benefits of society, but instead they evolve as needs
develop. See Scott Gordon, The New Contractarians, 84 J. POL. ECON. 573–90 (1976)
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b. Banking as a Public Good
The idea of public goods in the financial sector is not a novel one.
Economists have justified classifying banking as a public good based on
public trust,157 the services banks provide,158 a coherent financial regulation
and supervision framework,159 protection of the banking system and stability
during a financial crisis,160 the “Too Big to Fail Doctrine”,161 and the social
contract between citizens and the government.162 What is a more novel, but
(reviewing several contractarian models of government); see generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (articulating a theory of justice as fairness, where fairness is
defined by the principles that self-interested individuals would agree to if they were ignorant
of their own political identities). Under this approach, the government contracts or agrees to
provide goods that are needed for the public’s benefit. The exchange is mutually beneficial—
governmental institutions protect citizens by providing needed goods and citizens fund the
government and elect its leaders. The government involvement lends legitimacy to institutions
by creating processes and rules that are fair and collectively beneficial. The disincentive to
encourage private sector development is that it would limit government profits. See also
Holcombe, supra note 151, at 12–15 (describing a positive model of government, where the
government produces goods for its citizens who in turn provide wealth for the government).
157
E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks before the 7th
International Conference of Banking Supervisors in Cannes. France (Oct. 8, 1992), in E. Gerald
Corrigan, Challenges Facing the International Community of Bank Supervisors, FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1992, at 1, 6, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/
media/research/quarterly_review/1992v17/v17n3article1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U9B-Y2TR].
158
J.K. SOLARZ, FINANCIAL SYSTEM RISK MANAGEMENT 159 (2008).
159
Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, The Evolution of Financial Supervision: The
Continuing Search For The Holy Grail, in 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons &
Challenges 263, 272 (Niels C. Thygesen et al., eds., 2013), http://EconPapers.repec.org/
RePEc:erf:erffft:1 [https://perma.cc/9UYE-TVW8].
160
See Masiukiewicz, supra note 140, at 2 (“State intervention on a great scale during the
subprime crisis indicates that the governments and international institutions treat banking as
a special good.”); Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan on H.R. 10, the Financial Services Act
of 1998, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, THE FED. RES.
BOARD (June 17, 1998), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/
19980617.htm [https://perma.cc/ZGE2-BDMX] (“[D]evelopments in our financial system-especially, but not solely in our banking system--can have profound effects on the stability of
our whole economy”); KAREL LANNOO, COMPARING E.U. AND U.S. RESPONSES TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 (2010) (discussing the management of OTC derivatives by EU and
American central banks, and observing that, “Both regulators aim at ensuring financial
stability for the largest global financial market”).
161
G. G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crisis: A Taxonomy and Review, 9 FIN. MARKETS,
INST. & INSTRUMENTS 69, 110 (2000).
162
See HOWARD DAVIES, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. ONLINE, BANKING AND THE STATE:
CHANGING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 6 (2008), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21466/1/Banking
%26theState.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YL3-4R7P] (arguing that central banks’ involvement in
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less appealing, economic policy argument, is that banks have an economic
responsibility to the public. That responsibility is two-fold: (1) protecting
depositors and investors and (2) preserving systemic stability. Prudential
regulation is justified given the key role the financial system plays in the
economy.163 The crux of the economic responsibility argument is based on
the indisputable role that modern banking plays in maintaining financial
stability and the specific role that central banks play in systemic stability.
Banking is a public–private partnership and central banks have a
myriad of regulatory and operational functions. Central banks are the
wholesalers of banking services with commercial banks providing retail
services. Central banks create safety nets for financial institutions using
capital to maintain the solvency of individual banks, a banking group, or as
during the crisis, other entities in the financial system. Specifically, in the
United States, deposit insurance and access to the discount window are
benefits that banks receive from the federal government without which they
would be unable to operate.
First, the “public good” role of the financial system, as the pivot of
the economy, justified that the prudential regulation framework be
complemented by an intrusive supervisory framework. Deposit insurance
provides banks with a significant advantage. Banks are able to attract
customers because of the imprimatur of deposit insurance. The complex
supervisory system monitors institutions’ risk-taking and lack of
transparency to the depositors’ advantage. Customers do not have to
determine the soundness of the institution nor monitor its performance for
safety. The governance and risk management of individual financial
institutions, both of which impact creditworthiness, is monitored by
regulators.164 The system of regulation and supervision reduces customers’
costs of borrowing because banks have set capital requirements and
limitations on lending, both of which are returned to the customer.
Central banks serve as regulators of monetary policy. They have
macro-economic management responsibilities. As Lenders of Last Resort
(LLR), central banks prevent panic by providing credit to shore up
institutions facing a liquidity crisis.165 These economic tools used to shore up
banks all come from the public fisc or money supply. They are responsible
for monetary policy and the workings of the financial system as a whole.
the global liquidity crisis changed the expectations of financial institutions and the banks
given the poor financial performance of many financial institutions).
163
See discussion supra Part II.
164
Robert J. Dijkstra, Accountability of Financial Supervisory Agencies: An Incentive
Approach, 11 J. BANKING REG. 115, 115–28 (2010).
165
Murray N. Rothbard, The Origins of the Federal Reserve, 2 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 3, 39
(1999).
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Public involvement through financial assistance, restructuring bonds, tax
relief and nationalization of financial institutions are all among the ways that
central banks broadly protect against systemic failure.166
Central banks have an operational function regarding the payment
system. The central bank’s payments infrastructure facilitates payment
between the central bank, privately owned banks, and banks’ borrowers.
Banks’ settlement accounts with central banks can receive funds from the
central bank in case withdrawals exceed actual deposits. Privately drawn
checks clear through the payment system of one of the regional Federal
Reserve Banks.167 Banks make loans based on a fraction of the deposits they
hold. Banks are required to maintain a fraction of their deposit liabilities in a
reserve account. The lending bank must have sufficient liquid funds in its
account to cover withdrawals as well the reserve requirement.168 If the bank’s
account will be insufficient to maintain the reserves after the overnight
withdrawals, the bank must either borrow from other banks or from the
central bank. Inter-bank lending boosts confidence in the banking system by
ensuring that the necessary funds are available. Customers are reassured that
their deposits are safe, thereby reducing the risk of a bank run. Moreover,
this fiscal undergirding allows banks to profit from and make loans.169
While the proposals for financial inclusion can occur within the
Federal Reserve’s traditional mandates of stability and integrity of the
financial system, the next Section examines how the regulatory system thus
far has ineffectively addressed financial inclusion.
2. The Existing Regulatory Response
In the U.S., several changes to the banking regulatory structure are
targeted to provide access to those who face illegal discrimination. The
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), community development credit
unions (CDCUs), and community development financial institutions
(CDFIs) can be characterized as monitoring and providing access to credit
for those who have faced historical discrimination in credit markets.
Similarly, the recent postal banking proposal is specifically characterized
166
See generally Michael Diekmann. The Swing to the State Must Not Go Too Far, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/30c40f2c-cf62-11dd-abf9-000077b0
7658 [https://perma.cc/P2NH-B7BN] (discussing banks’ role in the economy and arguing
that the debate is not if central banks should intervene, but how they will intervene).
167
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 135, at 119 (explaining how
the Federal Reserve collects checks deposited by banks and returns unpaid checks to the bank).
168
See id. at 41–42 (describing the percentage of deposits that commercial banks must hold
as reserves).
169
Hockett & Omarova, supra note 140, at 480.

Vol. 5:4]

Doin’ Banks

97

as promoting financial inclusion.170 As discussed below, the limited focus
of these programs does not remedy the concerns noted above.
a. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), enacted in 1977, is the federal
statute that mandates that a bank serve its entire geographical community. The
statute has a limited purpose of increasing real estate lending.171 It requires
federal banking regulators to encourage financial institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the communities in which they do business, including LMI
neighborhoods.172 Designed to prevent and detect discrimination, the CRA
prohibits two well-established practices by financial institutions: disinvestment
and redlining.
Disinvestment occurs when depository institutions take deposits from a
community but fail to extend credit to credit-worthy members of that
community.173 Redlining is geographic discrimination. The historical practice
was for lenders to actually or figuratively draw a red line on a map around the
areas of their city, considered “poor credit risk” neighborhoods, which often
were black, lower-income, or ethnic.174 Lending standards for these identified
170

See Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for
the Underserved i (White Paper No. RARC-WP-14-007, Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.us
psoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/N89A-Y4SR] (outlining a proposal for using postal branches to provide “non-bank
financial services to those whose needs are not being met by the traditional financial sector”).
171
Under the service test, financial institutions provide and fund financial literacy
program.12 C.F.R. § 7.1021.
172
Nellie R. Santiago, et al., Turning David and Goliath into the Odd Couple: How the New
Community Reinvestment Act Promotes Community Development Financial Institutions, 6
J.L. & POL’Y 571, 573 (1998). The FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC each supervise
banks that have CRA obligations. The FDIC supervises FDIC-insured, state-chartered banks
and savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve
supervises state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. The OCC
supervises national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).
173
Specifically, the Act requires depository institutions to “demonstrate that their deposit
facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to
do business.” 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (2018). For more on divestment, see Gary M. Swidler,
Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 393 (1994) Gary
Swidler, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 393 (1994)
(defining disinvestment as “when depository institutions take in capital, usually in the form
of deposits, from one community and then use the funds to make loans outside that
community”).
174
The Congressional sponsor of the CRA described the practice as:
“[Taking] deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting them in
that community, they will invest them elsewhere, and they will actually or
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areas were different, with credit often non-existent because of those strict
policies.175
To combat these practices, the CRA requires the evaluating regulatory
agency “to assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of the entire
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent
with the safe and sound operation of such institution.”176 The CRA rating, which
is an annual assessment done by the banking regulators, is taken into account
when there is a bank merger or acquisition. At that time, regulators evaluate how
the institution has met the “credit needs” of the community.177
The CRA has its critics. Initial criticisms focused on the vague language178
and the indirect enforcement.179 Institutions found it difficult to interpret their
responsibilities on “meet[ing] the credit needs of local communities.”180 The
statute was amended to include three tests, (1) lending, (2) investment, and (3)
service, making obligations less vague.181 Communities found the statutes’
implementation ineffective.182 The CRA is also controversial because banks
figuratively draw a red line on a map around the areas of their city,
sometimes in the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods,
sometimes ethnic and sometimes black . . . .”
123 Cong. Rec. 17,630 (daily ed. June 6, 1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
175
Lenders restricted lending in these areas by having exorbitant interest rates and loan fees.
See Jonathan P. Tomes, The “Community” in the Community Reinvestment Act: A Term in
Search of a Definition, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225, 227–28 (1991) (discussing the
practice of justifying high interest rates that in effect restricted lending in certain
neighborhoods).
176
12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2018).
177
12 U.S.C § 2901 (2018).
178
See Allen Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but
Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 203, 297 (1993)
(critiquing the CRA as vague).
179
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 202–93 (1993) (critiquing the CRA ‘s burdensome
compliance costs).
180
A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1431, 1437–39 (1995) (describing the Act's language as vague, particularly “credit need,”
which could refer to a borrower’s ability to pay a risk-adjusted interest rate, or a borrower’s
ability to only afford a rate that did not reflect its risk of default); see also Jonathan A.
Neuberger & Ronald H. Schmidt, A Market-Based Approach to CRA, ECON. LETTER, 1994,
no. 21, at 1, 1 (arguing that "[t]he language of the CRA statute was intentionally vague,
balancing a social policy goal of encouraging banks to lend in lower income areas with
regulators' concerns about bank safety and soundness”).
181
12 C.F.R. §§ 228.22, 228.23, 228.24 (2019).
182
See Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S. Smith, The Community Reinvestment Act:
Evolution and Current Issue, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 251, 251 (1993) (explaining that “many
community and consumer groups…believe that financial institutions are not doing enough
to help meet the credit needs of residents and businesses in low- and moderate-income
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argue that it can become an unfair bargaining tool, even promoting risky
investments.183
Despite these controversies, the CRA has been successful to the extent that
it incentivized local financial institutions to reevaluate lending opportunities in
underserved areas.184 As discussed below in Part III, the CRA might prove useful
to measure banks’ effectiveness in financial inclusion efforts.
b. Community Development Credit Unions (CDCUs)
CDFIs were established with the aim of promoting economic
revitalization by providing low-income communities with access to essential
financial services.185 In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act.186 One of the many essential
areas”); see also Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act
and its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV., 513, 565 (2005) (noting that the CRA was generally
considered ineffective during the 1980s due to “inadequate regulatory attention”);
Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act,
79 VA. L. REV. 349, 349 (1993) (arguing that “the CRA may actually decrease the level of
investment in low-income and moderate-income communities, while imposing enormous
compliance burdens on banks”).
183
See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented
Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (1995)
(arguing that the “asymmetry of information” on a borrower’s risk of default between banks
and the borrower may discourage banks from lending to LMI communities).
184
Some studies have shown increased lending to underserved communities since the CRA’s
enactment, though it is difficult to distinguish how much of the increase was attributable to
just the CRA or whether the CRA-induced lending has been overall profitable. One study
attributed the statute’s design with the difficulty of assessing whether the incentivized lending
that of was profitable. See generally, e.g., Darryl E. Getter, Cong. Research Serv., R43661, The
Effectiveness of the Community Reinvestment Act 2, 9 (2020), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43661 [https://perma.cc/L83V-7P8A]; Sumit Agarwal et al.,
Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18609, (2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w18609.pdf [https://perma.cc/V942-479K]. While the CRA was not the cause of the
subprime crash, critics argue that it contributed to the housing bubble and the general
expansion of credit during the 1990s. See Lindsay, supra note 141, at 164.
185
Beginning in the 1880s, when the first minority-owned banks focused on low-income
areas, community organizations developed CDFIs to provide needed financial services. From
the creation of credit unions in the 1930s and 1940s, community development corporations
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, and to the more recent emergence of non-profit loan funds
in the 1980s, the predecessors to CDFIs sought to better the conditions in these economically
underserved markets. See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, What Are CDFIs? (n.d.),
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/CDFI_infographic_v08A.pdf. [https://perma.cc/K9ZN
-RZHW] (providing a brief history of CFDIs).
186
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, 66 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 470 (2018)).
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functions of this legislation was the establishment of the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund.187 The Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund procures funding through the United States
Department of the Treasury in order to invest in and assist CDFIs by
enhancing their liquidity.188
CDFIs come in many forms, the most common being CDCUs, and
Community Development Loan Funds.189 CDCUs are generally established
in order to provide fairly priced loans, as well as savings and checking
accounts for their low-income members.190 In addition, CDCUs serve the
essential function of bridging the gap between low- and moderate-income
borrowers and traditional commercial loans.191
At first blush, CDCUs purport to serve as an effective means of
integrating marginalized individuals in the United States into the formal
banking system. This approach to financial inclusion, however, has not been
universally accepted, and many CDCUs have struggled to maintain economic
viability.192 Approximately 50 percent of start-up CDCUs failed in the
1990s, which can be attributed to several factors including: “under-qualified
management and boards; inadequate capital, liquidity, bookkeeping, and
staffing; limited range of services; inadequate economies of scale; absence of
collaboration with community partners; and inadequate use of existing

187

Id. § 120.
12 U.S.C. § 4701 (2018).
189
Christopher Jordan Heisen, Comment, Community Development Lite: An Economic Analysis
of the Community Development Financial Institutions Act, 39 HOW. L.J. 337, 348 (1995).
190
A CDCU has a specific focus on the economic well-being of LMI members. . Robert W.
Shields, Community Development Financial Institutions and the Community Development
Financial Institutions Act of 1994: Good Ideas in Need of Some Attention, 17 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 637, 650 (1998).
191
CDCUs in some areas may help those whose access to credit is limited by income, but
not enough to qualify for government subsidies:
In addition to serving areas where no other lending institutions exist, CDCUs
serve a market niche that other types of lending institutions and programs do
not. For example, CDCUs serve as a place where low- and moderate-income
people can pool their savings and receive loans that they otherwise would not
be able to receive. Many of the low-and moderate-income borrowers’ income
is too high to qualify for government subsidized loan programs yet not high
enough for them to qualify for traditional commercial loans. They are,
however, able to obtain credit via CDCUs.
Id.
192
See Charles D. Tansey, Community Development Credit Unions: An Emerging Player in Low
Income Communities, BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/
community-development-credit-unions-an-emerging-player-in-low-income-communities/
[https://perma.cc/5V XT-4J65] (highlighting the multitude of reasons for CDCUs’ widespread
failure).
188
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programs and financial institutions to support their efforts.”193 Chartering a
CDCU, similar to a bank, requires meeting prerequisite conditions. The
organizational plan for a CDCU must show that it will be economically
viable. Before obtaining a charter, the organization must show that the
proposed combination of members, deposit, institutions and social investors
will produce a sustainable flow of capital.194
The failure of CDCUs to rectify the issue of financial exclusion can
be attributed to their weak financial performance when compared to that of
banks.195. Between the years of 2005 and 2010, the operating expense ratio
of these credit unions was 36 percent higher than the industry, and the ratio
of net operating expenses to average assets was 27 percent higher for CDFI
credit unions.196 Furthermore, CDFI credit unions have experienced
declining earnings and rising delinquency rates, which are higher than the
credit union industry as a whole.197
Finally, CDCUs are burdened with the requirement of maintaining
self-sufficiency in order to remain operational. As a result of this burden, and
without the margin for error that some of their more conventional
counterparts have, CDCUs often cannot engage in the very high-risk
financing that they were established to facilitate.198 Currently, there exist
approximately 237 CDCUs in the United States, in comparison with the 4518
commercial banks in the United States.199 CDUs, alone, have not addressed
the problem of financial exclusion, making the discussion below of postal
banking, a well-considered alternative at one time200

193

Id.
See Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial Institutions: Current Issues
and Future Prospects, 26 J. URB. AFF. 177, 189 (2004) (describing regulations to which
CDCUs must adhere in order to offer federal depository insurance).
195
Historical Trends as of December 31, 2019, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
statistical/stats/2019dec/fdic.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
196
NAT’L. CREDIT UNION ADMIN., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 142 (2012), https://www.ncua.gov/
Legal/Documents/Reports/AR2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/FET8-F65S].
197
Id. at 76.
198
For example, regulators have allowed relatively few CDCUs to make small-business loans
because of the higher risk involved in such lending. Neither banks nor credit unions can make
equity investments in start-up businesses (although non-regulated bank affiliates may do so). Id.
199
See Membership Directory, INCLUSIV, http://www.cdcu.coop/membership/membershipdirectory/ [https://perma.cc/B6C2-28NF] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (listing 247 CDCUs in
its national Membership Directory).); Statistics at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2019dec/fdic.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGG7NGYE]
(last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
200
See 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1 (“The unbanked rate in 2017 declined to the
lowest level since the survey began in 2009. Since the survey was last administered in 2015,
the unbanked rate has fallen by 0.5 percentage points.”).
194
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c. The Postal Banking Proposal
Similarly, the recent proposal calling for postal banking in the United
States recognizes the need to support financial inclusion as well as the
absence of a strong competitive alternative.201 In 2014, the U.S. Postal
Service Office of Inspector General released a white paper proposing that the
Postal Service provide non-bank financial services to individuals who are
underserved by the traditional financial sector.202 The white paper posits that
individuals remain unbanked or underbanked for a myriad of reasons, many
of which Post Offices are best situated to address.203 For example, the
network of post offices, stations, and branches is spread out across the
country, to include “banking deserts” and geographical areas where
individuals have little or no access to banks or other financial institutions.204
The proposal cites to Americans’ trust and familiarity with the postal brand
and the importance of trust in the financial services sector, particularly when
considering the experiences of unbanked and underbanked individuals in
dealing with fringe banking systems or untrustworthy financial service
providers.205 Further, the post office environment, policies, and procedures
are less intimidating than that of banks, and many Americans, including the
poor, are familiar with their location, the processes, and in some cases the
Post Office employees.206
201

See U.S. POSTAL SERV., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED i (2014) [hereinafter PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED] (contending that “[p]ostal organizations have an unmatched
ability to reach consumers from diverse backgrounds); cf. Eric Grover, Return to Sender: Here's
What's Wrong With Postal Banking, AM. BANKER (May 17, 2018), https://www.americanbank
er.com/opinion/return-to-sender-heres-whats-wrong-with-postal-banking [https://perma.cc/84
DY-CR24] (arguing against the use of postal banking). See generally, Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s
Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 174–75 (2014) (contesting that the
postal banking proposal will result in the predicated increased revenues because small
dollar loans are not profitable).
202
As stated in the white paper,
According to the FDIC, certain segments of the population are
disproportionately underserved, including lower-income, black, and
Hispanic households, as well as people under the age of 25. However, white
households still account for half of the underserved. Geographically, the
underserved live throughout the country. However, they are overrepresented in the South, where poverty is more prevalent, and in inner cities.
PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at 3.
203
Id. Consumers are unbanked for procedural reasons, e.g., violation of bank rules and/or
requirements, and cultural reasons, e.g., don’t feel comfortable using banks.
204
Baradaran, supra note 201, at 167–68.
205
PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at 6.
206
Baradaran, supra note 201, at 169.
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The proposal of a postal banking system is not a revolutionary
concept in the United States. In 1910, Congress established a Postal Savings
System in order to establish a formal savings system for immigrants who
were accustomed to saving at their local Post Offices in their home countries
and to integrate the unbanked poor into the formal banking system.207 The
nationwide program was designed to encourage savings by providing a secure
place to make deposits.208 By 1947, the Postal Savings System had
accumulated approximately $3.4 billion in savings deposits from 4 million
customers.209 Eventually, by 1964, the Postal Savings System saw a decline
in usage and deposits declined, dropping to $416 million.210 The system was
eventually discontinued in 1967 due to the decline in its usage.211
The success of the Postal Savings System and need for a solution
to integrate unbanked and underbanked Americans has sparked a proposal
for its resurgence in today’s financial services sector. Currently, the
United States Postal Service provides customers with limited financial
services such as money orders.212 The proposal would increase customers’
access to those services by broadening the scope of services provided and
establishing a public bank, which would also take deposits and make small
loans.213 An example of a payment service offered by the postal banking
proposal is the Postal Card.214 The Postal Card would function as a
prepaid card, allowing to load onto the funds onto the card and withdraw
cash at ATMs, pay bills online, and transfer funds.215 Furthermore, the
207

The Postal Savings System garnished support within the formal banking sector.
“Although bankers first viewed the Postal Savings System as competition, they later were
convinced that the Postal Savings System brought a considerable amount of money out of
hiding from mattresses and cookie jars.” Postal Savings System, U.S. POSTAL SERV. (July
2008), http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/postal-savings-system.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9KPE-YMJ8].
208
This program was created and geared to recent immigrants and the unbanked poor and at
the end of the first year, there was a total of $20 million in deposits. Baradaran, supra note
201, at 170.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Sending Money Orders, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://www.usps.com/shop/moneyorders.htm [https://perma.cc/VA8K-VVRE] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
213
See PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at i–
ii, 9–17.
214
Id. at 10.
215
According to the white paper,
With the development of highly secure identity verification systems and
partnerships with government at the local, state, and federal levels, the
cards also could send or receive tax payments and refunds, as well as
handle other government-to-citizen or citizen-to-government payments.
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Postal Service can partner with traditional financial institutions to provide
“an interest-bearing savings feature” on the Postal Card.216would allow the
underserved to develop a savings system to adequately prepare for a crisis
or save money for a large purchase.217
Opponents of the postal banking proposal assert that simply
utilizing post offices to provide financial services to unbanked and
underbanked Americans is not the comprehensive program needed to
effectively remedy financial exclusion.218 These opponents assert that
postal banking would not provide the financial education and planning
assistance that families in underrepresented communities need in order to
maintain long term financial stability.219
As discussed below, the adverse impact of the recent financial
crisis on large segments of the population raises questions about the
objectives of financial sector policy. Specifically, the issue becomes
whether the purpose of financial sector public policy is to ensure fiscal
stability as well as equity.
III. FINANCIAL SECTOR PUBLIC POLICY AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION
Two failures—banking concentration and the low quality of the
fringe banking industry (microfinance) institutions have created financial
exclusion. Bringing fringe bank consumers into the banking mainstream
requires that the financial impediments that banks face in offering those
accounts be resolved. Banks need to reduce the agency and transaction
costs involved in offering transaction accounts to maintain a competitive
advantage. This Part proposes allowing agent or branchless banking to
operate in commercial establishments as a way to increase access points
to the formal financial system for fringe bank consumers. The
recommendation would help prevent predatory practices in the provision
of financial services and make supervision of the financial inclusion
activities proportionate to the risks, rather than imposing onerous
regulatory costs on the banking sector.

Such a product would not only help reduce the government costs associated
with cash and check payments, it also would help fulfill the goal of bringing
the underserved into the mainstream financial fold. The funds on Postal
Cards could be covered by the FDIC insurance of a partner bank.”
PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED, supra note 201, at 10.
216
Id. at 11.
217
Id.
218
See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233, 295 (2017).
219
Id.
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A. The Agent Banking Proposal
Consumers who obtain financial services outside the mainstream
banking system may not receive the same level of safety and security.220 Yet,
creating confidence and trust among these consumers depends on their
relationship with the institution. Offering services designed for fringe bank
consumers requires acknowledging the expense, convenience, and cultural
preferences of this market segment.221
Agent banking is a cost-effective delivery model for financial
institutions.222 By changing the costs and risks of delivering financial services,
distribution channels outside the branch reach large numbers of unserved
people. The traditional agency relationship assigns responsibility to the
principal for the agent’s actions, making this a potentially costly endeavor.

220

See Ludwig, supra note 10.
See generally ELISABETH RHYNE, CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, MONEY MANAGEMENT,
FINANCIAL INCLUSION, AND BANKING THE UNBANKED 3–5 (2012), https://swiftinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Elisabeth-Rhyne-MoneyManagement-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6E2A-H4X2]. As one researcher noted, “From a policy perspective, if bank accounts are opened
but not used, their value in terms of broad social or economic objectives is limited.” Id. at 4.
222
Agent banking has resulted in revolutionary inclusion in the financial systems of Brazil,
Columbia, Peru, Malaysia, and Kenya as a business model used to provide access to financial
services in remote, unbanked areas of developing countries. See Paul M. Leonardi et al., Multiplex
Appropriation in Complex Systems Implementation: The Case of Brazil’s Correspondent Banking
System, 40 MGMT. INFO. SERV. Q. 461, 462 (2016) (discussing how Brazil’s new banking system
has led to financial inclusion); see also Kurt von Mettenheim & Olivier Butzbach, Alternative
Banking: Theory and Evidence from Europe, 32 BRAZ. J. POL. ECON. 580, 581 (2012) (discussing
the success of agent banking in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Austria).
The proposed model, which is similar to having a satellite bank, is not currently authorized
in the U.S. banking structure and requires new law and regulation. What U.S. banking
regulation allows are interbank relationships, which permit banks to perform various
functions for other banks. Moreover, correspondent banking is defined differently in the
United States than in developing countries where the structure is used to promote financial
inclusion. In the United States, a correspondent bank, unlike a branch bank, is independent and
separate in terms of ownership, financing products, and image. One of the distinguishing
features of bank correspondents is that the ordinary bank customer is aware that the banks are
separate from one another. The OCC defines “correspondent services” as “hold[ing] deposits
for other banks and perform[ing] correspondent services for those banks, such as check
clearing.” Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Activities Permissible for National Banks
and Federal Savings Associations 26 (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-res
ources/publications/banker-education/files/pub-activities-permissible-for-nat-banks-fed-sav
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTM3-F7GE]. Among the permissible common interbank functions
are receiving deposits on behalf of another bank and disbursement of loan funds. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 206 (2019) (describing limitations on interbank liabilities); see also United States v. Citizens
& S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 114 (1975) (explaining that “in neither law nor banking custom
has there developed a clear, fixed definition of the correspondent relationship”).
221
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1. The Law and Economics of Agency
Agency is a beneficial relationship between a principal and an agent
that results in an efficient division of labor.223 The principal benefits from the
effort of the agent; the agent provides the principal with her skill.224 It is
common for the principal to engage an agent even if the task is one that the
principal is capable of performing.
One of the significant concerns in agency theory is the misalignment
of the incentives that principals and agents have. Principals must always find
ways to mitigate the characteristic disincentive that agents have to not
perform in the principal’s best interests.225 To encourage the principal’s
supervision of the agent, law holds the principal responsible for the agent’s
misdeeds. Unquestionably, the principal has to weigh the expected benefits
of the agency relationship against the costs.226
The presumption in law is that the incentives of agents are aligned
with their principals. Principals are held liable for agents’ inappropriate
conduct or decisions.227 In economic terms, the relationship raises several
“costs” that should be considered.

223
See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 515, 536–45 (2007) (discussing the agency relationship in light of the preemption doctrine
and how the federal preemption doctrine denied state banking regulators the opportunity to police
the agents of depository institutions engaging in predatory lending practices).
224
Agency is (1) a consensual relationship; (2) where one person is a representative of
another; (3) the representative has the “power to affect the legal rights and duties of the other
person”; and (4) the “person represented has a right to control the actions of the agent.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
225
Id. at cmt. c. Meinhard v. Salmon is the classic agency case discussing fiduciary duty. See
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (finding the defendant liable for a breach of
contract in a joint venture agreement when the defendant failed to disclose related
transactions to the plaintiff).
226
Agency is not a costless relationship. The transaction costs a principal must assume are
monitoring and bonding costs as well as residual loss. See Alva Curtis, Delaware and the
Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 916–17 (1990)
(discussing Delaware’s ability to reduce agency costs in the corporate charters market).
227
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 224, at § 7.02. The law of agency is well summarized by
several notable authors. See generally Eric Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (John
M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, No. 92, 2000), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=204872 [https://perma.cc/V29Z-GLRY] (describing agency models
and agency relationships); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s
Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973) (examining a mathematical model of pareto efficient
agency cost allocation).
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Principals incur agency costs in order to spread the risk of loss in
case of agents’ wrongs.228 Monitoring costs are the costs of observing and
possibly controlling the behavior of the agent.229 Bonding costs are the
costs the principal incurs to recoup losses in case the agent acts against
the principal in a detrimental manner.230 Residual loss captures the lost
welfare that the principal incurs because of the agent’s failure to be
productive.231 It protects the principal when the principal cannot fully
police the agent’s decreased productivity, despite monitoring and bonding
costs.232
Third parties who deal with agents create significant cause for
concern in agency law. Aligning the motivations of principals and agents
requires holding the principal responsible for harmful acts of the agent
even when the agent acts outside the scope of her duties, as long as there
is a causal relationship.233 This underlies the rationale that principals can
use agents to engage in conduct that would be inappropriate or even
unacceptable had the principal herself engaged in the acts.
The inherent conflict of interest between the agent bank’s business
and the parent bank’s raises issues germane for regulatory oversight.
Moreover, the obstacles in the prudential regulation of banking services
through branchless banking arrangements must be analyzed.
2. Regulatory Oversight and Prudential Supervision of Agent Banking
In places where branching is not cost-efficient due to low deposit
enrollment, high transaction costs, and inadequate loan opportunities, agent
or branchless banking allows banks to offer traditional products.234 Agent
228

See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL’Y. REV. 265, 278–79 (1998) (discussing the costs that principals impose on agents
through an example of risk and loss spreading through a lawyer-client relationship).
229
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (describing agency
costs as “(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures of
the agent” . . . and “(3) the residual loss.”).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
See Peterson, supra note 223, at 540 (describing residual loss as often the dominant
agency cost).
233
See discussion infra note 277.
234
This proposal requires explicit statutory authorization and would change the traditional
separation of banking and commerce. See Stephen Halpert, The Separation of Banking and
Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481, 484–90 (1988) (describing three categories of
restrictions on bank conduct centered around nonbanking activity). Branchless banking, as
it has evolved in the United States, refers to the delivery of financial services outside of bank
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banking changes the costs and risks of delivering financial services through
distribution channels outside the branch.235 The typical agent bank hires

branches and without using bank personnel by relying heavily on technology to complete
transactions. See Sandra B. McCray, Constitutional Issues in State Income Taxes: Financial
Institutions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 895, 903 (1987) (discussing how the history of branch banking,
as allowing banks to branch across states lines before the Graham-Leech-Bliley Act, eased the
restrictions on interstate banking). In emerging countries, branchless banking involves relying
upon an agent to assist with the transaction. See Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe, Transformative
Technology in Microfinance: Delivering Hope Electronically?, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y.
1, 17 (2012) (describing the role of microfinance institutions delivering products, such as
mobile banking, in an increasingly technological world). Professor John Caskey recommends
a different, but similar approach for reaching the unbanked. See JOHN P. CASKEY, BRINGING
UNBANKED HOUSEHOLDS INTO THE BANKING SYSTEM 5 (2002), https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/caskey.pdf [https://perma.cc/89DW-5TUH]. He proposes
having banks offer check-cashing services at highly competitive rates in specialized bank
branches or “outlets.” Id. Caskey posits that this would create new sources of revenue, adding
to the branches’ profitability. Id. Additional services would include wire transfers and
remittances and in-person payment services for utility and other household bills. Id. The
other unique feature of the outlets would be their placement, which should be in locations
that are convenient for LMI households. Id.
235
Correspondent banking, a type of agent banking, is a very popular and successful business
model that provides access to financial services in remote, unbanked areas of developing
countries. See Leonardi, supra note 222, at 461 (describing the rise of a new banking system
aimed at overcoming financial exclusion through providing access to a country’s formal
financial system). The proposed model, which is similar to having a satellite bank, is not
currently authorized in the U.S. banking structure and requires new laws and regulation.
What U.S. banking regulation allows are interbank relationships, which permit banks to
perform various functions for other banks. Moreover, correspondent banking is defined
differently in the United States than in developing countries where the structure is used to
promote financial inclusion. In the United States, a correspondent bank, unlike a branch
bank, is independent and separate in terms of ownership, financing products and image. One
of the distinguishing features of bank correspondents is that the ordinary bank customer is
aware that the banks are separate from one another.
Fintech, Financial services via technology, is a disrupter that is leading towards
wholesale digital transformation of the banking industry. As noted earlier, the Federal
Reserve’s efficacy as a link between payments and the transmission of money is critical. In
August 2020, the Federal Reserve announced the FedNow Service, which will operationalize
in 2023 or 2024. FedNow Service, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_about.htm [https://perma.cc/
HTF5-ZKY2] (last updated Aug. 6, 2020). The liquidity tool will support an instant payment
service providing real-time payment to consumers. To the extent that it allows LMI
consumers to avoid high-interest loans and expensive check cashing services, it will both
provide access to and decrease the costs of participating the formal banking economy. Jeanna
Smialek, The Fed Moves Closer to a New Way to Get People Their Money Faster, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/business/the-fed-moves-closer-toa-new-way-to-get-people-their-money-faster.html [https://perma.cc/V2MZ-7WP3].
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nonfinancial commercial establishments as agents.236 These entities provide
financial services on the bank’s behalf, increasing the geographical
dispersion of banking services.237 Agent banking systems are more
sustainable than branch banking because mobile technology and the existing
network of local agent bank retailers control establishment and operation
costs.238
Agent banking systems widen the parent bank’s distribution
channel for products and services through the contractual relationship
between the parent bank and the agent bank. 239 The contract determines
the scope of services, i.e., accepting deposits and making loans, fees paid
and risk-sharing. Preferably, agent banking combines the services of banks
236

This proposal raises the common conflict of the powers and duties of banks versus
nonbanks. A bank is commonly defined as an institution that takes deposits and makes
commercial loans. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)
(1982) (defining bank holding companies and stipulating rules for expansion and
divestment). Nonbanks are restricted to offer only one of these services. See generally Carl
Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks—An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 BUS. LAW. 99, 100 (1985)
(discussing deregulating the activities of bank holding companies). Although the agent bank
will accept deposits, it will be a subsidiary of a bank and regulated by the Federal Reserve
under the Bank Holding Company Act.
237
See id. (discussing the implications of forming a “nonbank bank” in this way).
238
See Dzikamai Shoko Bizah, Linda Gumbo & Rabson Magweva, Agent Banking as a
Driver of Financial Inclusion in Zimbabwe: A Review, 5 INT’L J. EDUC. & RES. 89, 92–94
(2017) (concluding that agent banking reduces most of the transactional costs of banking).
Another author identifies and describes four types of agent banking:
1. POS-enabled bank agent – This is an agent managed by a bank that uses
a payment card to identify customers.
2. Mobile phone-enabled agent – This is an agent managed by a bank that
uses a cell phone to identify customers.
3. Mobile wallet – This is an agent that is often managed by a telecom,
uses a cell phone to identify customers, and provides store-of-value
accounts called mobile wallets that are backed by bank deposits.
Customers can use mobile wallets to send, receive, and store electronic
monetary value. For this analysis, we consider them a store of value
account that provides a useful comparison for a savings account directly
provided by a financial institution.
4. Bank-provided account linked to a mobile wallet – This is a bank
account that is linked to a mobile wallet. The bank does not manage the
agent and pays a fee to the telecom for deposits and withdrawals.
CLAIRE VENIARD, HOW AGENT BANKING CHANGES THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL ACCOUNTS 1–2
(2010), https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/Documents/agent-banking.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HW8W-C3FZ].
239
See Henry Thomas Mwangi Maina &Willy Mwangi Muturi, Factors Influencing the
Uptake of Agency Banking Services by Customers in Commercial Bank in Kenya: A Case of
Kenya Commercial Bank, 2 STRATEGIC J. BUS. CHANGE & MGMT. 179, 181 (2014)
(describing agency banking’s potential to increase financial services provided to lower
income individuals who are not sufficiently reached by traditional bank branch networks).
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and check cashers. In addition to cashing checks and processing bill
payments, agent banks should have transactional operations, accepting
deposits for checking and savings accounts.240 Banks can expand their
profits as consumers become aware of the banks’ available products for
credit, saving, and insurance.241
An agent banking system, while most cost-effective for transactional
accounts with low balance and frequent transactions, offers advantages for
both the fringe bank consumer and the financial institution. For the fringe
bank consumer, location alone increases inclusivity.242 The convenience of
less travel time to access banking services is important. Moreover, banking
services in retail locations have flexible hours and are in a familiar, nonthreatening environment.243 Agent banking systems dramatically diminish
rent, administration costs, and labor costs. In addition to the reduced
infrastructure and customer costs, the financial institution incurs transaction
costs only when a transaction occurs.244 Agent banks can also expect an
increase in revenue and the high likelihood of a new customer segment.245
Although an agent banking system is an optimal way to develop scale in
financial inclusion, it has its disadvantages. Repeated incidences with the
logistics of poor service could discourage consumer use. If locations are not
240

Agent banking systems reach optimal profitability when consumers use mobile based
agents and mobile wallets. See VENIARD, supra note 238, at 3 (discussing the costeffectiveness of transactional accounts for agent banking systems).
241
Id.
242
See Anjali Kumar et al., Accessing Financial Access in Brazil 24–26 (World Bank
Working Paper No. 50, 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINCLUSIVEFIN
SYS/Resources/AccesstoFinancialServicesBrazil.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S35-MEAN].
243
See SAI KUMAR JAYANTY, AGENCY BANKING: NEW FRONTIERS IN FINANCIAL INCLUSION 3
(2012) (discussing how agency banking has reduced costs even as it reaches new customers);
CAITLIN SANFORD, DO AGENTS IMPROVE FINANCIAL INCLUSION? EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY IN BRAZIL 15 (2013) (arguing that despite their convenience and accessibility, agent
bank services are not of a good quality).
244
Transaction costs make banking operations in underutilized locations extremely
expensive given the fixed costs of operating a branch. On the other hand, given that the agent
bank’s operating costs are fixed already, the agent bank is incentivized to operate as a
financial services provider at full capacity because each transaction earns a commission. See
VENIARD, supra note 238, at 3 (finding that total costs per deposit transaction are
significantly higher if the delivery channel is a branch instead of an agent bank).
245
While arguably agent banks can cross-sell financial products, a more effective strategy may
require incurring additional marketing and sales costs. See Anjali Kumar et al., Expanding Bank
Outreach Through Retail Partnerships: Correspondent Banking in Brazil 3–4 (World Bank,
Working
Paper
No.
85,
2006),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en
/912991468016248173/pdf/363980Retail0p101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/L7AN-TH2C] (showing how formal, regulated financial institutions have partnered
with commercial entities to bring financial services to underserved communities and develop
new sources of revenue).
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secure or problems recur with network connectivity or equipment
malfunctions, customers may also become dissatisfied.246 The failure to
maintain liquidity or to meet the cash needs of customers could result in
discontinued use.247 The increased regulatory requirements and more
complex procedures and product offerings could increase the costs of
operating an agent banking system.248 Agent banks hire their own employees.
While financial institutions often adopt a corporate identity and culture to
influence the customer experience, financial institutions cannot directly
control the behavior of the agent bank’s employees. Thus, the behavior and
conduct of the agent bank and its employees in providing the services could
send a message of disinterest and dissuade customers from using agent banks.
3. Agent banking and the payment system
Payment systems ensure the circulation of money through a
coordination of policies and procedures that facilitate the clearing and
settlement of funds. The payments service market is composed of various
arrangements that coordinate the production, processing and pricing of
payment instruments, services and delivery.249 The payment infrastructure
connects payment service providers and users through information service
operators and technology providers.250
Agent banking needs a robust competitive payment system in order
to operate. Interoperability among payment systems means a system or
product is compatible with other systems or products.251 Ideally,
interoperability allows for seamless payment transfers regardless of country,
bank, currency, or regulations.
246
See Fred Gichana Atandi, Challenges of Agent Banking Experiences in Kenya, 3 INT’L. J.
ACAD. RES. BUS. & SOC. SCI. 397, 399 (2013) (describing the potential barriers to agent
banking implementation).
247
Maina, supra note 239, at 181.
248
See VENIARD, supra note 238, at 4.
249
For a discussion of the role of central bank money in payment systems, see generally
Disyatat , supra note 143.
250
See generally id.
251
In the United States, the automated clearing house system (ACH) has developed because
of the involvement of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve Bank system has facilitated
interoperability through effective regulation, an efficient, operational infrastructure, and
using the ACH for government benefits and tax payments. The Electronic Payments Network
also runs a part of the ACH Network. See Steve Mott, Can ACH and Image Convergence
Succeed?, BAI BANKING STRATEGIES, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 1, 2; Processing Services, ELEC.
PAYMENTS NETWORK, https://www.epaynetwork.com/cms/services/processing/001459.php
(last accessed June 5, 2020); Fed. Res. Fin. Servs., FED. ACH OPERATIONS AND PROCESSING,
https://www.frbservices.org/Retail/OperationsProcess.htm [https://perma.cc/CT 5Y-TMVE].
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The cooperative development of processes and technologies by
banks, networks, processors, and other service providers has the advantage
of being both cost-efficient and enhancing risk management.252
Interoperability can also be achieved when mandated by regulations.253 By
designing a simple and relatively inexpensive system and supporting state
government use of the ACH system, the Federal Reserve made access to the
national payment system less demanding. Using the dynamic retail payment
market will require a balance between cooperation and competition. The
mechanism for the clearing and settlement of relatively low-value payments
means that communication service operators and other nonfinancial entities
provide the services. As shown below, the benefit of a deeper, more
diversified financial system is long-term financial stability making the
potential costs of financial inclusion compensable.
B. An Agent Banking Model for the U.S.
A financial access agenda must balance the innovation and
experimentation needed without compromising the safety and soundness of
the banking system. The 2017 FDIC National Survey included information
on the use of mobile banking by the underbanked and showed an increasing
familiarity of mobile banking use for basic financial transactions.254
Technology can permit banks to manage the differentiated customer model
that fringe bank customers need profitably and safely. Agent banking allows
banking beyond branches by providing access to banking through electronic
transactions.255 Based on the success in emerging economies, a modified
252

See Amelia H. Boss, Convergence in Electronic Banking: Technological Convergence,
Systems Convergence, Legal Convergence, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 63, 91 (2009) (discussing the
regulatory gaps in convergence and interoperability of payment platforms).
253
Interoperability in payment systems is achieved when: 1) banks join a simple scheme,
agreeing to be bound by rules set by that scheme, 2) network interoperability, connecting
networks through a negotiated payment scheme and exchange agreement- often used for
cross-border or cross-regional payments acceptance, 3) parallel system interoperability,
allowing merchants or agents accepting payments from consumers to participate in multiple
schemes. See Carol Coye Benson & Scott Loftesness, Interoperability in Electronic
Payments: Lessons and Opportunities, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (May 2013),
https://www.cgap.org/research/publication/interoperability-electronic-payments-lessons-andopportunities [https://perma.cc/YP8D-EAKF] (describing three conditions for achieving
interoperability in payment systems).
254
More than two in five unbanked households already use mobile banking for basic financial
transactions. 2017 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 2, at 14.
255
See Ignacio Mas, Shifting Branchless Banking Regulation from Enabling to Fostering
Competition, 30 BANK. & FIN. L. REV. 179, 183–84 (2015) (discussing the need to curtail
the barriers to entry while protecting the integrity and stability of branchless banking).
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version of branchless banking might work in the United States. Relying on
mobile connections, banking agents connect to financial institutions in realtime, allowing banks to deliver transaction services through an intermediary
more efficiently than delivering them directly. Banks can create widereaching branchless channels that use cards and point-of-sale (POS)
devices.256 This solution addresses the high costs and lack of proximity that
exclude so many from access to the formal banking sector.257
The most significant feature of this model is that the financial
products should be transformational. The mobile financial products offered
should be based on research that integrates innovation with features that the
unbanked need to access the banking economy. Products that are made
specifically for fringe bank consumers consider their need for cash, no float
requirements, and small dollar loans. These mobile banking products should

This discussion distinguishes agent and branchless banking, which provides financial services
digitally from Fintech companies. While both use electronic transactions, branchless banking
is a platform offered by banks that allows customers to access cash or accounts through mobile
phones using Internet connectivity. See ANNABEL SCHIFF & MIKE MCCAFFREY, REDESIGNING
DIGITAL FINANCE FOR BIG DATA 5–6 (2017), https://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=2967122
[https://perma.cc/X4ZG-CRJY]. It helps the unbanked by providing electronic access to a bank
account, and allows customers to contract for new services, such as loans, insurance, or
certificates of deposit. Fintech companies are technology companies that provide access to the
payment system through banks. Id. It refers to using a mobile device to access information from
or send information to an existing bank account. Id. It is beneficial to banked customers, but
not to the unbanked.
256
Several central banks have adopted this model. For example, the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) uses business facilitators and business correspondents. Agents under this model
function similar to the way correspondent agents function under the model used by the
Central Bank of Brazil. Correspondent agents provide a wide array of services, including
disbursing small-value credit, collecting loan payments, performing small-value remittances
and selling credit. Those regulations also authorize transactional agents, who engage in bill
payments, withdrawals, and transfers. See generally, Guidelines for Engaging of Business
Correspondents, RES. BANK OF INDIA, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/bs_viewcontent.aspx?
Id=2234#A3 [https://perma.cc/WRR2-3KSU] (last accessed May 19, 2020).
257
Agent or “branchless banking” is 19% cheaper than traditional banking because of the lower
overhead expenditures. CLAUDIA MCKAY & MARK PICKENS, BRANCHLESS BANKING 2010:
WHO’S SERVED? AT WHAT PRICE? WHAT’S NEXT? 5 (2010), https://www.cgap.org/sites
/default/files/researches/documents/CGAP-Focus-Note-Branchless-Banking-2010-Who-IsServed-At-What-Price-What-Is-Next-Sep-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQN8-94XS]. In a recent
study, the Federal Reserve Board studied consumers’ use of mobile technology to access
financial services and make financial decisions. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/econres data/mobile-devices/files/consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201603.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P3P9-J3VT] (finding that the use of mobile payment activities was lower than
the use of mobile banking).
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be distinguished from those mobile banking products developed and
marketed for the bank’s general population.258
The similarities in the operations of banks and agent bank retailers
speak to the needs of fringe bank consumers. First, agent bank retailers will
offer identical services as check cashers.259 Familiarity and the absence of
stigma are among the reasons that many underserved consumers use check
cashing outlets. With numerous agent bank retailers presumably available
throughout a community, the consumer chooses the preferred retailer, thereby
encouraging participation and frequent use. The fact that many retail
establishments already cash checks makes this idea even more cogent.
Second, consumers will experience greater efficiency in banking
services. Agent bank retailers will become transaction centers, handling the
routine transactions usually conducted at a branch, e.g., deposits, withdrawals,
balance inquiries, transfers, and account registration. This change gives
consumers access to a wider selection of services than check cashers can
legally provide. Consumers will benefit from lower transaction costs with the
accumulated costs of check cashing and money order purchases removed.260
They are also encouraged to save. After depositing a paycheck, bill payments
can be debited from an account with a balance remaining to withdraw later.
Depositing funds in a bank reduces the risk of theft for consumers.
Prudential regulation of banking makes using a “bank-centric” model
optimal. A bank develops its own mobile-banking platform to assess the
payment system that its agents use.261 The role that banks play in the payment
system provides a strategic advantage and also generates revenue. Using the
258

See Ahmed Dermish et al., Branchless and Mobile Banking Solutions for the Poor: A Survey
of the Literature, 6 INNOVATIONS 81, 84 (2011) (discussing the feasibility and utility of
branchless and mobile banking); see also DAVID PORTEOUS, JUST HOW TRANSFORMATIONAL IS
M-BANKING? 9–10 (2007), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-pa
per-just-how-transformational-is-m-banking-feb-2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GNX2-4W2U]
(discussing how mobile banking has altered the banking landscape, especially with regard to
accessing basic banking accounts in South Africa).
259
Agent bank retailers will offer this service as a convenience, but not necessarily for a
lower price. See Rubin, supra note 28, at 232 (positing that the proliferation of check cashing
outlets in low-income neighborhood makes the pricing competitive).
260
Id.
261
Id.at 220–21. Due to the lack of regulation and supervision of nonfinancial institutions, a
branchless banking model based on nonfinancial institutions providing financial services is not
recommended. Non-financial institutions, such as fintech companies, are subject to OCC
regulations, but as discussed above, supra note 255, those technology platforms are not a
solution to the problem of the unbanked because they require customers to have bank accounts.
One commentator prefers “banking beyond bank branches” because of the specialized banking
channels that develop. See Claire Alexandre, Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Regulating New
Banking Models to Bring Financial Services to All, 54 CHALLENGE 116, 123 (2011) (arguing
that existing branching restrictions and branch regulations should be modified).
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bank’s branding, agent bank retailers who are geographically dispersed reach a
wider customer base. The agent bank retailers pay the bank to offer transaction
services making these services more cost-efficient for both the customer and the
bank.262 The lack of dependence on a telecommunications company means more
control and more profit for the bank. It also assures intuitional solvency and
fiscal stability because of the applicable banking regulations.263
Regulatory classifications will determine the functions and services.
Agent banks can provide essential services, including check cashing services,
bill payments, withdrawals, and transfers.264 They could also identify
borrowers, collect and submit account and loan applications, therefore
verifying and doing preliminarily process data.265
The account structure will limit the principal bank’s liability. The
agent bank retailers’ deposit-taking is designed so that it is merely an interaccount transfer, which does not increase the liabilities of the banking system.
To limit the bank’s credit exposure, the agent bank should be required to prepurchase electronic value from the principal bank.266 A customer’s cash
deposit will result in an immediate transfer of an equivalent electronic value
from the store’s account to the customers’ account. Provided that the bank
authorizes the transaction in real time, no financial risks arise from the store’s
262

The integration of “[t]he value of data integrated to a live registration, underwriting and
onboarding process is a prime example of how solution providers can bring improved
efficiency and KYC elements to financial institutions while enhancing the service delivery
for their merchants and reselling partners.” Richard McShirley, Innovation: Bank Centric
Payments, BANKNEWS (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.banknews.com/blog/innovation-bankcentric-payments/ [https://perma.cc/G8P9-KTP8].
263
A bank-centric model is characterized as one where the “the bank leads the chain.” See
Senthe, supra note 234, at 19. In addition to the bank-led model of mobile banking, there are
several other ways to implement agent banking. These include: 1) mobile network operators
(MNOs), i.e., the teleco-led model, a partnership with telecommunications carriers and
technological companies; 2) microfinance institutions (MFIs) which can serve as financial
institutions; 3) MFIs acting as agents for commercial financial institutions; and 4) the
“consortium model,” comprised of private and public sector members, such as MFIs,
technology, and financial groups. Id. at 17–21.
264
For example, an agent bank would perform a “cash-in cash-out function” when a customer
cashes a check. The agent bank debits its account at its bank and credits the customer’s
account at the agent bank. Providing “cash in/cash out” service is a ‘deposit-taking’ activity
requiring regulatory compliance. 12 U.S.C. 1813(l) (2018).
265
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) imposes customer due diligence on financial institutions as
a way of combating illicit financial activity and traditional financial crimes, including money
laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. The corresponding “Know Your Customer” (KYC)
regulation requires banks verify customers who open new accounts. See 31 C.F.R.
1010.100(e) (2019). While agent bank retailers could assist with this function, arguably there
should be less stringent KYC requirements for low-dollar transactions.
266
The bank is able to limit its liability because of the pre-paid account but only if the
transactions are authorized in real time by the bank.
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handling of the deposit.267 By exchanging the customer’s cash for an equivalent
deposit into the prepaid account, the retailer never holds any financial assets
that belong to either the customer or the bank. What appears to be the taking
of a deposit is merely a cash swap.268 Using mobile technology, customers
are able to immediately see their accounts credited securely, thereby reducing
any risk. Banks can serve those previously underserved due to the small or
zero profit margin and develop a viable market segment.269
Small-dollar bank accounts established through an agent bank retailer
raise issues of how to protect them. The funds are not bank deposits nor stored
in the customer’s name. Regulations should require fund custodians to store
an equivalent amount in a bank account or pooled trust accounts. Investments
should be in low-risk liquid assets and restrict the use of the electronically
stored-value sums.270
The branchless banking infrastructure is critical in order to mitigate
operational and technological risks. To the extent that branchless banking uses
mobile banking platforms, it is subject to telecommunications and financial
regulation.271 Banking regulations have explicit rules regarding reporting,
ownership,272 and deposit pooling limitations273 that agent bank retailers will
need to comply with or modify. Specifically, agent banking regulations need to
define the delivery channels and provide for license and registration
267
See Claire Alexandre et al., Regulating New Banking Models to Bring Financial Services
to All, 54 CHALLENGE 116, 132 (2011).
268
As the authors explain:
Viewed in this light, the store is not acting as an agent for the bank in the
legal/economic sense: the store is its own principal. The store acts as a cash
merchant, offering cash in/out services because it sees a revenuegenerating opportunity from leveraging its own bank account. The store is
more of a value-added reseller of the bank’s service – a super-user that
uses its account to take the other side of a customer’s transaction (i.e. either
cash for e-money, or vice versa).
Id. at 125.
269
See Alberto Chaia et al., A New Idea in Banking for the Poor, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 10,
2010), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/a-new-idea-inbanking-for-the-poor [https://perma.cc/4K8Q-C2PA] (proposing that, “[b]y teaming up with
retail outlets in low-income, often hard-to-reach areas, financial institutions can create value
both for themselves and their new customers”).
270
See generally KATE LAUER, DENISE DIAS & MICHAEL TARAZI, BANK AGENTS: RISK
MANAGEMENT, MITIGATION, AND SUPERVISION (2011), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default
/files/researches/documents/Focus-Note-Bank-Agents-Risk-Management-Mitigation-andSuper
vision-Dec-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE8A-VBJU] (discussing challenges of regulating agent
bank investments.)
271
Senthe, supra note 234, at 12–20 (discussing generally how microfinance banking
requires an interaction between technology and banking regulations).
272
12 C.F.R. § 330.6-339.13 (2018).
273
12 C.F.R. § 32.3 (2018).
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procedures.274 The deposit taking activity needs capital adequacy requirements
which will set minimum capital thresholds.275 Regulations could dictate different
levels of licensing and registration based on the nature of the deposit-taking
entity, account balance limits or channels through which deposits are taken.
Oversight policies for a safe and efficient payments system balance
the trade-offs between financial stability, efficiency, and soundness.276 The
stability and integrity of the financial system requires regulators to address
the prudential concerns of consumer protection; the security and efficiency
of the payments system; as well as data security, privacy, and accessibility.
Regulations will be needed to determine agent suitability and licensing.
Those regulations should discuss compliance and risk management functions,
including liquidity management, as well as procedures and how agents will
be staffed, monitored and renewed.277
Using agent bank retailers may bring new consumer protection risks.
Regulation in this area must meet the difficult goal of promoting innovation
while simultaneously protecting consumer interests. Creation of effective
new products requires customers to perceive them as trustworthy and fair.
The risk to consumers arising from loss of payment instruments, fraudulent
transactions, and entity theft raise common supervisory concerns that may
need to be addressed.278 Although a number of nonfinancial providers are
involved in agent banking, e.g. mobile phone companies and agent retailers,

274

Although most agent banking is done through mobile phones or retail agents, the FTC,
which regulates unfair trade practices, does not have regulatory authority over mobile
banking. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (providing that the FTC’s jurisdiction does not extend
to “banks” or “savings and loans institutions”). For additional background on the new
opportunities in mobile banking created by information and communications technology, see
generally Michael Klein & Colin Mayer, Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion: The
Regulatory Lessons (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5664, 2011),
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/516511468161352996/pdf/WPS5664.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JK5T-5CMZ].
275
Implementing the proposals recommended in this Article requires changing the structure
of insured deposit accounts. The FDIC, as the regulator of depository institutions, arguably
would have appropriate regulations for the supervision of these entities.
276
See Malaguti, supra note 29, at 1–2 (asking, “how can regulators balance the creation of
an inclusive payments system with maintaining its stability, integrity, and safety?”).
277
Banking regulators need access to all data on the agent. Agent banks will be subject to
reporting, inspection, and examination to assess and monitor. Regulators should require
banks to seek approval before any major operational or infrastructure change. Onsite
inspection of a bank is planned based on the materiality of operations or the risk assessment
conducted through offsite monitoring. See LAUER ET AL., supra note 270, at 1–12.
278
DANIEL LOZANO ET AL., A NEW AGENT MODEL FOR BRANCHLESS BANKING IN COLOMBIA
9–11 (2010) (discussing traditional banks and branchless banking).
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those providers would be subject to existing transparency and disclosure
requirements for consumer financial transactions.279
Finally, identifying and keeping track of the specific tasks that agent
bank retailers perform is also critical for determining financial inclusion.
Specifically, significant financial measures include the number of agent bank
retailers, the percentage of the principal bank’s business and the activities
(as measured by principal’s assets or revenues or profits), the percentage of
the loan portfolio handled by agent bank retailers, and the number and
aggregate size of all transactions handled by the agent bank retailers.
In using the branchless banking model, agent banking can impact
financial inclusion positively for both consumers and banks. Access to
affordable financial services benefits fringe bank consumers, who have a
more secure environment to manage their financial lives. The benefits of
financial inclusion to the economy as a whole raises the issue of the central
bank’s responsibility to ensure access to the formal banking sector.
C. Federal Reserve Policy and Financial Inclusion
Central banks have the dual objectives of promoting and maintaining a
safe and efficient payment system and providing access to it. Central banking
arguably creates a social contract between the banking system, regulators, and
the government. As discussed above, the involvement of central banks in the
global economic crisis reflects a “seamless” banking system and is fundamental
to a well-functioning financial system.280 Central bank intervention is required
to promote financial stability, which is enhanced when every citizen has
access to the payment system.

279
CFPB has jurisdiction over “service providers” and “covered persons.” See Adam J.
Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 321, 344–47 (2013). Covered persons are defined as “any person that engages in
offering or providing a consumer financial product or service and any affiliate of a [covered
person] if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.” 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)
(2018). Service provider “means any person that provides a material service to a covered
person in connection with the offering or provision by such covered person of a consumer
financial product or service . . .” Id. at § 5481(26). Consumer transactions, which would
include agent banking, fall within the defined scope of “consumer financial products or
services,” as long as the service “is offered or provided for use by consumers primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes" or certain ancillary services provided in connection
with the offering or provision of a consumer financial product.” See Levitin, supra note 279,
at 345. Therefore, at a minimum, agent bank retailers must comply with CFPB regulations.
Thus, consumers engaging with agent bank retailers will have consumer protection at the
federal level.
280
See discussion, supra Subsection III.A.3.
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The distributive effects of financial sector regulation regarding bank
access needs greater clarity and focus. Access to financial services, the safe
transfer of funds, and monetary exchange all occur though payment and
settlement systems. Undoubtedly, the Federal Reserve’s role in maintaining
economic stability is a critical one; equally important is the Federal Reserve’s
role in regulating the financial sector to alleviate inequality in the larger
economy. The failure to develop an inclusive financial infrastructure increases
risk; stymies’ economic development; and has negative consequences on the
fiscal competitiveness of individuals, communities, and small businesses.
1. Tax Incentives for Inclusionary Banking
An inclusive economy requires that every citizen has access to
financial products and services that are that useful and cost-effective. The
payments system is the gateway to financial inclusion. As discussed above,
the Federal Reserve has a strong interest in maintaining a safe and efficient
payment system that will help support economic activity and promote the
smooth implementation of monetary policy.281 The fundamentals of financial
inclusion, fair access to the market, a level playing field, support for
innovation, and some level of interoperability are the same for the payment
system. The question becomes how to implement these parallel objectives.
Tax legislation is commonly used to achieve social or economic
goals. A fundamental premise of tax policy is the provision of public goods
and services. A tax incentive is way of instituting a policy without a direct
governmental expenditure, sometimes described as a “small economic
footprint” that does not disrupt market forces.282
The new delivery channels for financial products and services as
proposed in this Article require leveraging developments in mobile
technology. Financial institutions that offer transaction accounts to fringe
bank consumers may need tax incentives or credits to defray the costs of
providing traditional banking services.283
281

See infra Subsection III.A.3.
Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 977 (2011)
(defining tax subsidies as “tax laws that offer special tax deductions, credits, and other tax
benefits designed to accomplish public policy goals”). Although often lauded as a way to
achieve social equity, one commentator questions whether tax incentives are reviewed for
effectiveness. See generally Richard Krever, Analysing Implicit Tax Expenditures, 35
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 427 (2011) (positing that indirect tax subsidies and incentives should
be evaluated as rigorously as explicit tax spending for their benefits).
283
No federal law requires banks to offer basic bank accounts. The Dodd-Frank Act
authorized Treasury to implement a program of grants to “enable low- and moderate-income
individuals to establish one or more accounts in a federally insured depository institution.”
282
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Existing law allows national banks to make investments that are
primarily designed to promote the public welfare and that primarily
benefit LMI individuals and LMI areas.284 This incentive alone could
encourage bank agent retailers and thereby further financial inclusion.
However, allowing a financial inclusion tax incentive for banks
that provide LMI bank accounts implicitly encourages banks to act in the
public interest. It is an additional way of recognizing that affordable
access to the payment system is a public good. A financial inclusion tax
incentive would target LMI accounts while relying on the banks’ voluntary
cooperation to implement this regulatory goal.285
A financial inclusion tax incentive is a more feasible alternative
than the direct spending required for postal banking. First, postal banking
requires the government to create a separate, costly financial services
infrastructure to handle LMI bank accounts. Second, postal banking
necessitates the postal service developing competence and expertise in
financial services. Conversely, a financial inclusion tax incentive absorbs
some of the costs of providing LMI bank accounts; it also offers a viable
option to banks willing to partner with the government to provide a
government-sponsored banking service.
2. Annual Reporting
The objective of financial inclusion policy is to integrate the
unbanked into the formal financial economy. Formal financial services are
costly for both banks and the underserved. The small volume of cash that
fringe bank customers circulate makes providing formal banking services

12 U.S.C. § 5623 (2018). The FDIC initiated a pilot program, FDIC Model Safe Accounts,
that encouraged banks to offer low fee transactional accounts that disallowed checks and
overdraft transactions. Although the economic feasibility for banks of offering the accounts
was not reported, some of the participating banks reported the marginal costs of the accounts
was low. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC MODEL SAFE ACCOUNTS PILOT: FINAL REPORT 7
(2012), http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/SafeAccountsFinalReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/68CA-YQ5Y].
284
The National Bank Act gives banks this investment authority and also authorizes
investments in areas targeted by a government entity for redevelopment. See 12 U.S.C. § 24
(2018) (“Eleventh. To make investments directly or indirectly. . . .”); 12 C.F.R. § 24 (2018)
(implementing the regulation). Banks are also eligible for a “qualified investment” tax credit
as defined under the CRA. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.23 (2018).
285
Eligibility for the tax incentive should be based on specified guidelines. For example,
Massachusetts state law requires state-chartered banks to provide certain consumers with no
cost checking and savings accounts that meet definitive guidelines regarding available
transactions and services. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.167D, § 2 (2019).
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inefficient for most large banks. Fringe banking is convenient, but expensive
with no savings or credit history component.
Financial inclusion is measured biennially in the United States, yet,
for fringe bank consumers, a need remains to increase affordable, secure
access to payment services. The specific financial inclusion challenge faced
in the U.S. is providing competitive, low-cost bank accounts for LMI
consumers who are unable to maintain minimum account balances rather than
access to non-competitive, higher priced payment services.
As argued above, failure to correct financial exclusion is a negative
statement about the value of economic inclusion in this country.286 It also
forestalls the economic spillover when cash-based transactions are counted
in the economy. The importance of financial inclusion for economic
development requires crafting a national strategy to address specific
challenges and achieve specific goals. Although this national priority is
commonplace in developing countries, and usually is implemented by their
central banks, the United States has not made a serious commitment to
financial inclusion
Banks should report and be specifically graded on financial inclusion
as a part of the yearly CRA assessment. Currently, the lack of data makes it
difficult to accurately assess what banks are doing to bring fringe bank
consumers in their communities into the formal banking sector. Among the
factors relevant to the CRA service test is the availability and effectiveness
of alternative systems for delivering retail banking services in LMI
geographies and to LMI individuals.287 While banks receive CRA points for
providing low-cost checking and savings accounts, no data on the number of
accounts offered and the income of the customers is required. In addition,
CRA exams should assess whether the accounts are affordable in terms of
overdraft protection and high fees that make the accounts too expensive for
LMI consumers. This focused reporting allows for a more nuanced
understanding of how banks are performing in the LMI markets.
Financial inclusion requires a competitive banking system, with
institutions designed to serve the particular needs of LMI consumers. These
proposals encourage the Federal Reserve, as the nation’s central bank, to take
affirmative steps to embrace its mandate and ensure equitable, sustainable,
access to the payment system for all Americans.

286

See supra Section II.A.
See 12 C.F.R. § 345.24(d) (2019) (providing performance criteria for retail banking
services).
287
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CONCLUSION
Two fundamental market failures—bank concertation and the low
quality of the fringe banking industry—apply distinctively to financial
exclusion. Balancing costs with access is the conundrum that banks face. Yet, a
stable economy requires a competitive banking system, with institutions deigned
to serve the particular needs of LMI persons. Additionally, allowing the informal
banking sector to monopolize providing financial services to LMI consumers is
a choice that furthers income and economic inequality. Instead, the United States
should consider branchless banking—the regulatory approach adopted in several
developing countries. The change would contribute to addressing the noncompetitiveness and market failures of the fringe banking industry.
The banking regulatory framework can remove structural barriers that
constrain access by investing in financial infrastructure where fringe bank
consumers live and work. Using mobile payment platforms and existing retail
stores agents, a new delivery channel can provide access with lower transaction
costs for both banks and consumers.
Policies that enable banks to contract with nonbank retail agents to
provide financial services have proven highly successful in advancing financial
inclusion where bank branches are not economically viable. With technology
reducing the costs and risks of these financial transactions, banks and retail
businesses, acting as bank agents, can enter into a viable, cost-effective and
useful strategic partnership.
Branchless banking presents significant regulatory and supervisory
challenges. Regulation in this area must meet the difficult goal of promoting
innovation while simultaneously protecting consumer interests. The proposal
leverages existing retail infrastructure as delivery channels and bank agents.
Substantial concerns for consumers include timely transaction settlement to
minimize fraud and simplified account opening procedures. Increased regulatory
guidance and oversight will require inter-operability to allow consumers to
operate across networks and prevent larger agent bank retailers from dominating
the market. Guidance on how to structure the legal frameworks that govern the
relationship of the financial institution with the agent is also critical.
Despite the foregoing, branchless banking holds great promise for fringe
bank consumers and if the concerns noted herein are effectively addressed, the
collaboration between retail establishments and insured financial institutions
may have the ability to influence how fringe bank consumers access the formal
banking economy.

